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ESSAY
FDA AND THE RISE OF THE
EMPOWERED CONSUMER
LEWIS A. GROSSMAN ∗
This Essay traces the still-evolving view of consumers of products regulated by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as capable, rational, and rights-bearing decision
makers. It also examines the corresponding diminution of FDA’s role as a paternalistic
gatekeeper working with medical and scientific experts to prevent products and
manufacturer-provided information about products from reaching the public. Compared
with their 1960s counterparts, today’s consumers of food and drugs have far greater
freedom to make unmediated choices among a wider variety of products, guided by a
relative deluge of labeling and advertising information. Moreover, food and drug
regulation, once the exclusive domain of bureaucrats and experts, has become a focus of
successful social movement activism.
The Essay explores these phenomena against a background of three societal and
cultural trends during the past five decades: Americans’ declining trust in major
institutions, the “rights revolution,” and the dramatic expansion of health care information
accessible to consumers. It then analyzes a variety of specific regulatory developments
during this period of change. In its discussion of food, the Essay considers the evolution of
standards of identity and nutrition labeling, the rise of health claims as facilitated by the
First Amendment, and various popular movements for freedom of choice with respect to
food ingredients and dietary supplements. The Essay then turns to drug regulation,
examining the rise of patient labeling and direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising of
prescription drugs, the tidal wave of “switches” from prescription to over-the-counter
(OTC) status, and the development of social movements intended to shape FDA drug
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approval policy. The Essay concludes by speculating on whether this new model of
consumer is a permanent one and by considering the implications of this question for FDA
regulation in the future.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ...............................................................................................628
I. Cultural and Societal Developments ..............................................633
A. The Loss of Trust ...............................................................633
B. The Rights Revolution ......................................................636
C. The Changing Health Information Environment .............639
II. Regulatory Developments for Food and Dietary Supplements ......640
A. Labeling and Standards of Identity....................................641
B. Social Movements ..............................................................646
III. Regulatory Developments for Drugs ..............................................651
A. Labeling and Advertising ...................................................651
B. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising .......................................657
C. Prescription versus OTC Status.........................................663
D. Social Movements ..............................................................666
Conclusion .................................................................................................675
INTRODUCTION
Imagine Jane, a typical consumer in 1966. When shopping for food, she
has relatively few choices within each product category; nearly half of the
nation’s food products—including staples such as milk, cheese, bread, and
jam—are subject to FDA-imposed recipe-style standards of identity that
allow little variation. 1 Food labels contain barely any useful information.
There is no “Nutrition Facts” panel. The labeling of many foods does not
even include a statement of ingredients. Nutrient content descriptors are
rare; indeed, FDA prohibits any reference whatsoever to cholesterol. 2
Claims regarding foods’ usefulness in preventing disease are also virtually
absent from labels; FDA considers any such statement to render a product
an unapproved, and thus illegal, drug. 3 The same is true for claims
regarding a food’s effect on the structure or function of the body. 4
1. Food Labeling; Tentative Positions of Agencies, 44 Fed. Reg. 75,990, 75,997 (Dec.
21, 1979) (codified at 21 C.F.R. ch. 1). At their broadest reach, food standards covered
nearly 45% of the wholesale value of food shipped in interstate commerce, excluding fresh
fruits and vegetables. Id.
2. Status of Articles Offered to the General Public for the Control or Reduction of
Blood Cholesterol Levels and for the Prevention and Treatment of Heart and Artery
Disease, 24 Fed. Reg. 9990 (Dec. 10, 1959).
3. PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND
DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 418 (4th ed. 2014).
4. Id. at 443.
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If Jane wants to purchase food fortified with vitamins and minerals, her
choices are limited. Although more foods are fortified than were during
World War II, the spread of fortification has been stalled by FDA’s
vigorous efforts to restrict the practice. 5 The agency is also endeavoring to
restrict Jane’s choice of vitamin and mineral supplements; it has issued
regulations to limit the amounts and types of nutrients available in such
products. 6 Meanwhile, Jane will learn little or nothing from the labeling of
vitamin, mineral, and herbal supplements about their potential benefits;
FDA, in the midst of a self-proclaimed war against “quackery,” is
aggressively fighting virtually all health-related claims for these products. 7
When Jane is suffering from seasonal allergies, recurring acid indigestion,
a vaginal yeast infection, or severe diarrhea, she is unlikely to find much
relief from an over-the-counter (OTC) medicine, so she probably has to
visit a doctor to obtain a prescription. Jane knows little or nothing about
her prescription remedies or their alternatives. Her physician likely does
not discuss such issues with her in detail, and the only written information
Jane receives about these drugs is the basic directions for use on the
dispensing labels. Moreover, Jane cannot easily educate herself about
pharmaceutical products. There is no Internet, of course, but there are also
no guides to prescription medicines available in regular bookstores. Jane
has almost certainly never seen a prescription drug advertisement in print,
and she has definitely never viewed one on television.
Jane is completely ignorant about FDA’s process for approving food
substances and drugs—these issues are the exclusive domain of government
bureaucrats and scientific experts. Neither Jane nor anyone she knows has
ever sought to influence federal food and drug policy in any way. Not
coincidentally, even desperately ill patients suffering from diseases without
any approved treatments are rarely allowed access to promising therapies
under investigation.
Now compare Jane’s situation to that of Jason, a consumer in 2014.
When he goes to the supermarket, Jason chooses from among a dizzying
array of traditional foods, food variants, and variants of variants. Many of
these products have been formulated specifically for consumers with
particular health concerns. Furthermore, food labels impart abundant
health-related information to Jason, including some explicit disease
prevention claims. The dietary supplement section of the supermarket
occupies yards of shelf space and contains an enormous selection of
5. Dietary Supplements and Vitamin and Mineral-Fortified Foods, 31 Fed. Reg.
8521, 8526–27 (June 18, 1966) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 80).
6. Id. These regulations were stayed due to objections. Order Staying Effective Date
of Regulations, 31 Fed. Reg. 15,730 (Dec. 14, 1966).
7. Lewis A. Grossman, Food, Drugs and Droods: A Historical Consideration of Definitions and
Categories in American Food and Drug Law, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1091, 1124–25 (2008).
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vitamins, minerals, herbs, botanicals, amino acids, and other ingredients.
Moreover, the labeling of many of these supplements directly or indirectly
promotes their efficacy for diseases and health problems.
For health issues that Jason cannot address adequately through dietary
choices and supplement use, the supermarket’s OTC drug aisle offers a
plethora of potent remedies, many of which used to be available only by
prescription. If he must visit his physician, Jason can readily research his
condition and the potential therapies for it before his appointment, and he
may specifically request that his doctor prescribe him a drug that he has
learned about through a television advertisement. Jason’s doctor is
ethically required to discuss Jason’s course of treatment with him, but even
if she neglects to do so, Jason will probably learn quite a bit about the drug
from the written material he receives from his pharmacist when he fills his
prescription.
If Jason (or a relative or friend) suffers from a serious disease, he may
belong to a patient advocacy group that seeks to influence FDA’s decisions
regarding pharmaceutical treatments for that condition. Indeed, if he is a
leader of his disease community, Jason may serve as a patient representative
on an FDA advisory committee or be invited to participate in agency
meetings with industry sponsors of new drug applications. Due to three
decades of political engagement by disease group activists, a variety of
formalized programs now exist through which Jason might gain access to
therapies prior to FDA approval.
How do we explain the very different postures of Jane and Jason with
respect to FDA-regulated products? FDA treated Jane’s mid-1960s
cohort—with some justification—as passive, trusting, and ignorant
consumers. The federal government, in conjunction with scientists and
physicians, rigorously controlled Jane’s food and drug supply and restricted
the dissemination of information concerning it. Consumers, for their part,
rarely attempted to shape food and drug policy in any way. By
comparison, Jason has unmediated access to many more products and to
much more information about these products. Moreover, modern
consumers have acquired significant influence over the regulation of food
and drugs and have generally exercised this influence in ways calculated to
maximize their choice.
Both cultural and regulatory changes underlie the emergence of the
consumer as an active and informed participant in the forging of food and
drug law and in the management of his or her own diet and health.
Regulation has shaped culture and culture has shaped regulation; the arrow
of influence runs in both directions. In some of the instances I discuss
below, social movements impelled statutory and administrative
developments that in turn promoted consumer sovereignty. Other
regulatory changes I explore were not directly provoked by popular
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demand but nonetheless provided consumers with the information and
product access they needed to embrace greater autonomy.
Before I commence my analysis of these trends, a few caveats are in
order. First, I want to emphasize that this Essay maintains that today’s
consumers of FDA-regulated products are relatively more empowered than
their counterparts of fifty years ago, not that they exist in an idealized world
of perfectly informed, unfettered choice.
Although highly literate
consumers with ample resources and generous health insurance have
indeed achieved a great deal of autonomy with respect to FDA-regulated
products, the same cannot be said about the uneducated, the impoverished,
and the uninsured. As historian Nancy Tomes has pointed out with regard
to the medical arena: “[P]atient/consumer empowerment movements . . .
[have] succeeded far better at securing specific rights . . . than in fostering
systematic change in the health-care system.” 8
Second, I concede that the increase in available information does not
perfectly correspond to a more knowledgeable population. A surfeit of
information can overwhelm consumers, leading them to attend to it
selectively or ignore it altogether. 9 Furthermore, the context of the
information matters greatly; advertising and promotional materials, even
when highly regulated by the government, inevitably present a biased
picture to consumers. And much of the medical information available on
the Internet is anecdotal, misleading, or downright false. 10
Third, in the portions of this Essay in which I examine the direct impact
of social movements on food and drug regulation, or in which I more
modestly suggest that certain regulatory developments reflected public
preferences, I do not intend to deny the importance of corporate influence
over food and drug law. Rather, I seek to add a complicating layer of
analysis to those scholarly approaches that flirt with economic determinism
by advancing explanatory theories such as “regulatory capture” 11 and “rent
seeking.” 12 In this connection, it is important to observe that not all of the
8. Nancy Tomes, Patients or Health-Care Consumers? Why the History of Contested Terms
Matters, in HISTORY AND HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: PUTTING THE PAST BACK
IN 83, 101 (Rosemary A. Stevens et al. eds., 2006).
9. See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS
(2004).
10. See, e.g., James S. Starman et al., Quality and Content of Internet-Based Information for Ten
Common Orthopaedic Sports Medicine Diagnoses, 92 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 1612 (2010).
11. See generally Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y 203 (2006); Paul Sabatier, Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: Toward a More
Adequate—and Less Pessimistic—Theory of “Clientele Capture,” 6 POL’Y SCI. 301, 302 n.3 (1975).
12. Foundational articles in the rent-seeking literature include, for example, Gordon
Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967); Anne O.
Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971);
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government actions I discuss—whether regulatory or deregulatory—clearly
favored the most powerful elements of industry. 13 For example, major
sectors of the food industry—such as the influential dairy lobby—opposed
FDA’s weakening of the strict standards-of-identity regime. 14 Drug
manufacturers, along with organized medicine, initially opposed the
introduction of mandatory direct-to-patient labeling of prescription drugs. 15
And the pharmaceutical industry has never been enthusiastic about
expanded access programs for unapproved, investigational therapies. 16
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the exercise of “free choice”
is not truly “free” with respect to addictive products. This stipulation
obviously applies to addictive drugs and to tobacco products, the latter of
which fell under FDA’s jurisdiction in 2009. 17 One must also, however,
recognize the growing amount of research concluding that human beings,
as a biological matter, do not have completely free will to reject foods
containing certain combinations of salt, fat, and sugar, often in amounts
that industry has calibrated specifically to induce irresistible cravings. 18
Despite these caveats, I am confident in asserting that today’s consumers
of food and drugs have significantly more freedom of choice than did their
counterparts a half-century ago, that they are enormously more
knowledgeable about these products when they make these choices, and
that they have much more influence on FDA policy.
In Part I of this Essay, I will consider some broad societal shifts since the
mid-1960s that provide the cultural foundation for the emergence of the
modern empowered consumer. These trends include a general loss of
confidence in the complex of established institutions involved in the
production and regulation of food and drugs; a “rights revolution” that
and Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
13. It is also important to keep in mind that industry sometimes desires regulation.
Historians long ago began challenging the progressive historical view that government
regulation and private capital were necessarily at odds with each other. See, e.g., GABRIEL
KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN
HISTORY, 1900–1916 3 (1963) (discussing how during the Progressive Era, federal regulation
“was invariably controlled by leaders of the regulated industry, and directed toward ends
they deemed acceptable or desirable”).
14. See, e.g., Nicholas Wade, Ice Cream: Dairymen Imperiled by FDA’s Recipe, 197 SCI. 844
(1977).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 140-143 (discussing the initial opposition to
prescription drug labeling that a layperson could understand).
16. See Jerome Groopman, The Right to a Trial: Should Dying Patients Have Access to
Experimental Drugs?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 2006.
17. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, div. A,
123 Stat. 1776–1852 (2009).
18. See generally DAVID A. KESSLER, THE END OF OVEREATING: TAKING CONTROL OF
THE INSATIABLE AMERICAN APPETITE (2009); MICHAEL MOSS, SALT SUGAR FAT: HOW THE
FOOD GIANTS HOOKED US (2013).
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encompassed patients’ rights and consumer rights; and a dramatic
expansion—first on paper and then online—of health information easily
accessible to ordinary consumers. Part II will consider various regulatory
developments with respect to food that both reflected and reinforced these
cultural developments. First, Part II will describe how FDA has shifted
from an approach to food regulation that restricted both the composition of
food and the information disseminated about it to an approach that favors
consumer choice and provision of information. Next, Part II will analyze
the first significant social movements aimed at shaping FDA policy, both of
which involved food products—vitamin/mineral supplements and
saccharin. Part III, which focuses on drugs, will explore FDA regulatory
developments that have allowed patients more direct access to information
about these products and to the products themselves. These include the
agency’s embrace of patient labeling and direct-to-consumer (DTC)
advertising of prescription drugs and the wave of switches from prescription
to OTC status. Part III will then consider social movements focused on
FDA policy in the drug area, specifically the unsuccessful campaign to
pressure the agency to permit marketing of the unproved cancer treatment
Laetrile and the subsequent, more fruitful effort by the AIDS community to
persuade FDA to lower the barriers and quicken the process for introducing
AIDS drugs—and ultimately, drugs for all life-threatening conditions—
onto the market. The Essay concludes by suggesting that the last five
decades have seen an evolution in the very meaning of “consumer rights”
and by asking whether consumers of FDA-regulated products will carry
their enhanced role into the future.
I.

CULTURAL AND SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Loss of Trust

One critical change in American society during the past half-century has
been the citizenry’s declining trust in the leaders of all major national
institutions, including the entire complex of bureaucrats and experts who
exercise control over the food and drug supply.
The turning point appears to have occurred primarily in the late 1960s
and the 1970s, a period marked by the Vietnam War debacle, racial
tensions, the Watergate scandal, an energy crisis, and a stagnated economy.
In the emerging field of 1970s studies, scholars agree that one of the
defining characteristics of the decade was a loss of faith in institutions and
in professional expertise. Edward D. Berkowitz observes that during this
period, “people’s faith in their political and professional leaders waned.” 19
19. EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, SOMETHING HAPPENED: A POLITICAL
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Bruce Schulman perceives “a revulsion against established institutions.” 20
Peter N. Carroll points to “a spreading disillusionment about the
competence of the dominant institutions of society.” 21 Although confidence
in these institutions has periodically waxed and waned since 1980, the trust
level has never come anywhere near its mid-1960s peak.
This rise of anti-establishment feeling is reflected in polls measuring
Americans’ confidence in the federal government, the medical and
scientific establishments, and corporations—that is, almost every actor in
the country’s food and drug production and regulatory systems. For
example, since 1958, an organization called American National Election
Studies has asked Americans how often “you can trust the government in
Washington to do what is right.” 22 In 1964, 76% of respondents said either
“most of the time” or “just about always,” and in 1966, 65% provided one
of these answers. 23 Thereafter, the frequency of these positive responses
steadily declined, and by 1980, only 25% of respondents gave one of these
two answers. 24 Although this measure of trust has bounced around
erratically since 1980, it has never approached its mid-1960s high. 25
Polling data gauging the level of confidence in FDA itself is sparse, but
the agency appears to have maintained the public’s esteem for longer than
other federal institutions. While citizens’ trust in the federal government as
a whole generally evaporated in the 1970s, FDA regularly received
approval ratings of 70% to 80%, and this number was still as high as 61%
in 2000. 26 After the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the public’s
confidence in FDA fell dramatically. In 2006, only 36% of respondents
voiced a positive view of the agency. 27
OVERVIEW OF THE SEVENTIES 6 (2006).
20. BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, THE SEVENTIES: THE GREAT SHIFT IN AMERICAN CULTURE,
SOCIETY, AND POLITICS 140 (2001).
21. PETER N. CARROLL, IT SEEMED LIKE NOTHING HAPPENED: THE TRAGEDY AND
PROMISE OF AMERICA IN THE 1970S 235 (1982).
22. Trust the Federal Government 1958–2008, AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES,
http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_1.htm (last updated Aug. 5,
2010).
23. Id.
24. Id. Even more dramatically, the subset of respondents saying they “just about
always” trusted the federal government plunged from 17% in 1966 to only 2% in 1980. Id.
25. See id. The combined “most of the time” and “just about always” responses sank to
a low of 21% in 1994. They reached as high as 56% in 2002, but this was a temporary
spike; by 2008 the total was back down to 30%. Id.
26. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 12, 749 (2010). In a 1999 survey, 58% of
respondents stated that “food and drug regulation” benefitted them “a great deal” or “a fair
amount”—a figure higher than that for any other federal government function mentioned in
the poll. Id. at 12–13 n.16.
27. Id. at 749–50.
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Surveys measuring Americans’ confidence in the medical establishment
quite closely track those concerning their trust in the federal government.
In 1966, no less than 73% of respondents expressed a “great deal” of
confidence in the leaders of medicine. By 1979, this number had
plummeted to 30%, and it has since wavered within a range well below its
mid-1960s peak. 28 According to another recurring survey, confidence in
the leaders of the scientific community has followed a similar pattern. 29
Notably, Americans’ trust in large corporations has also experienced an
enormous drop between the era of Jane and the era of Jason. 30
Presumably, therefore, the public does not favor simply allowing food and
drug companies to manufacture and claim whatever they want.
Americans’ cynicism about government and scientific expertise does not
necessarily translate into support for food and drug deregulation. Instead, I
suspect, Americans’ distrust of major institutions has led them to the
following position. On the one hand, they believe that FDA has an
important role to play in ensuring the basic safety of products and the
accuracy and completeness of labeling and advertising. 31 On the other
hand, they generally do not want FDA to inhibit the transmission of
truthful information from manufacturers to consumers, and, except in cases
in which risk very clearly outweighs benefit, they prefer that the
government allow consumers to make their own decisions regarding what
to put in their bodies.

28. Confidence in Congress and the Supreme Court Drops to Lowest Level in Many Years, HARRIS
INTERACTIVE (May 18, 2011), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/
HarrisPolls/tabid/447/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/1508/ArticleId/780/Default.asp
x [hereinafter HARRIS, Current Confidence in Leaders of Institutions]. The results vary from 22%
(in 1992 and 1993) to 44% (in 2000). Id.
29. According to this survey, the proportion of Americans voicing “a great deal of
confidence” in the leaders of the scientific community fell quite abruptly—from 56% to
32%—between 1966 and 1971, and it has measured in the high 30s or low 40s percentage
wise ever since. Trends in Public Attitudes about Confidence in Institutions, NAT’L OP. RESEARCH
CTR. (May 2013), http://www.norc.org/PDFs/GSS%20Reports/Trends%20in%20
Confidence%20Institutions_Final.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L OP. RESEARCH CTR., Confidence in
Institutions].
30. Whereas 55% of respondents expressed “great confidence” in “major companies”
in 1966, only 16% stated the same view in 1980. Since then, this number has ranged
primarily between 10% and 20%. See HARRIS, Current Confidence in Leaders of Institutions, supra
note 28. This figure dropped as low as 9%, in 1990, and reach as high as 28%, in 2000. Id.
Responses to the same question posed by the General Social Survey have generally been a
bit higher. See NAT’L OP. RESEARCH CTR., Confidence in Institutions, supra note 29.
31. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the advertising of prescription
drugs, while the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulates the advertising of food and
over-the-counter (OTC) drugs.
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B. The Rights Revolution
The 1970s have also frequently been identified as the period of the
“rights revolution.” 32
Concepts like women’s rights, gay rights,
environmental rights, disability rights, and consumer rights dominated the
national conversation. 33 As discussed below, this “rights talk” also extended
forcefully into the world of health and medicine.
Although the “rights revolution” may have peaked in the 1970s, the
phenomenon actually occupied a broader period. 34 The various rights
movements of the 1970s built on the racial civil rights movement of the
prior decade. 35 In his book The Rights Revolution, Samuel Walker goes
further and locates the origins of the rights revolution in the 1950s, or
perhaps even the 1930s.36 Importantly, Walker also maintains that the
“flood tide” of the rights revolution covered not only the 1970s, but also the
1980s, 37 and that it continued until at least the late 1990s, when he wrote
his book. 38 Dominic Sandbrook similarly argues that the rights revolution
“survived the rise of conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s,” and that in
many respects these rights “survived the Reagan and Bush years unscathed
and even enhanced.”39 Nevertheless, the 1970s are a particularly
important period, for it was then that a comprehensive rights culture
coalesced. 40
One important aspect of the rights revolution that blossomed in the
1970s was the notion of “patients’ rights.” The genesis of the patients’
rights movement appears to have been the drafting in 1970 of twenty-six
such rights by the National Welfare Rights Organization. 41 This action
32. See, e.g., BERKOWITZ, supra note 19, at 133–57; DOMINIC SANDBROOK, MAD AS
HELL: THE CRISIS OF THE 1970S AND THE RISE OF THE POPULIST RIGHT 249–50 (2011).
33. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 19, at 133–57; SANDBROOK, supra note 32, at 249–50.
34. A Google “Ngram Viewer” graph of the use of the word “rights” in American
English-language books from 1800 to 2000 shows a fairly steady climb in the use of the word
throughout the period from the early 1960s to 2000. Google N-gram Viewer, GOOGLE,
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=rights&year_start=1800&year_end=200
0&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t1%3B%2Crights%3B%2Cc0
(last
visited May 13, 2014).
35. See, e.g., SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION
IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT (1979); JAMES A. HENRETTA ET AL.,
AMERICA: A CONCISE HISTORY 897–901 (5th ed. 2012).
36. SAMUEL WALKER, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY IN
MODERN AMERICA 33 (1998).
37. Id.
38. Walker’s book assumes that the rights revolution, although under increasing attack,
continued up to the time of publication. Id.
39. SANDBROOK, supra note 32, at 250.
40. Id. at 33.
41. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 93 (1986); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE 145
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precipitated a widespread discussion that culminated in the adoption of “A
Patient’s Bill of Rights” by the American Hospital Association in 1973. 42 A
central theme of this document was the protection of informed consent. 43
The phrase “informed consent,” as well as the very notion of a patient’s
right to full disclosure and to ultimate decision making, did not exist until
the late 1950s. 44 Before this time, to the extent that doctors provided
information to and received consent from patients, they did so out of a
sense of beneficence, not because they viewed their patients as having a
right to autonomy. 45 Even after informed consent first appeared as an
issue, it did not immediately assume its current importance in medical
ethics. 46 A study in the late 1960s, for example, showed that 50% of
physicians thought it medically appropriate for a doctor to perform a
mastectomy based solely on a blanket consent form signed at the time of
hospital admission, and 53% thought that it was ethically appropriate for a
doctor not to tell a cancer patient that she was participating in a placebocontrolled study of an unapproved drug. 47 The 1973 Patients’ Bill of
Rights thus represented a sea change. It unambiguously declared that a
patient has the right not only to refuse treatment, but also “to obtain from
his physician complete current information concerning his diagnosis,
treatment, and prognosis, in terms the patient can be reasonably expected
to understand,” and the right “to receive from his physician information
necessary to give informed consent prior to the start of any procedure
and/or treatment.” 48
In addition, during the 1970s, Americans’ widespread suspicion of
establishment institutions and professional experts led many to seek medical
rights outside of orthodox medicine. As I will describe later, this
phenomenon was emblematized by the battle for access to Laetrile, an
unapproved cancer drug derived from apricot pits. 49 American medicine in
the 1970s was characterized by a “trend toward self-help” excluding
doctors, a shift that included the embrace of folk remedies and of lifestyle
and dietary changes as means of disease prevention. 50 As late as 1998, a
(1991).
42. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 41, at 93. The authors identify this document as
“only one, albeit the most influential, of several patients’ rights statements to appear in the
1970s.” Id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 59, 86–87. Faden and Beauchamp say the term was “coined in case law in
1957.” Id. at 87.
45. See id. at 59.
46. See id. at 90–91.
47. Id. at 89.
48. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 41, at 94.
49. BERKOWITZ, supra note 19, at 10.
50. Id. at 10; CARROLL, supra note 21, at 308–09.
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Prevention Magazine poll discerned a continuing “trend toward selfcare . . . .” 51
Finally, it should be noted that the patients’ rights movement overlapped
in significant ways with other rights movements—for example, those for
disability rights, racial civil rights, and (somewhat later) gay rights. 52
During the 1970s, the most influential exercise of this intersectionality was
the relationship between the patients’ rights and women’s rights
campaigns. 53 Their greatest shared triumph was the Supreme Court’s
recognition, in Roe v. Wade, of a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an
abortion. 54 Their common concerns extended well beyond reproductive
freedom, however. Feminists of the era expressed general dissatisfaction
with the treatment of women by a patriarchal, technocratic medical system,
and they sought greater agency for women patients in all health decisions. 55
It is no accident that, as discussed below, the first two major battles over
mandatory direct-to-patient labeling of prescription drugs concerned birth
control pills and estrogen replacement therapy, respectively. 56
C. The Changing Health Information Environment
The final cultural trend worth emphasizing is the revolution in the
amount of health information available to common citizens. Manuals on
51. National Survey of Consumer Reactions to Direct-to-Consumer Advertising,
PREVENTION MAGAZINE, 1998, at 2.
52. On the connection between the disability rights movement and the patients’ rights
movement, see Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons from Medical
Consumerism and the Patients’ Rights, Women’s Health and Disability Rights Movements, 20 AM. J.L. &
MED. 147, 163–66 (1994). The racial civil rights movement’s attention to health
discrimination was heightened in 1973 with the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare’s publication of the Final Report of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Advisory
Panel. This report condemned the withholding of treatment and the lack of informed
consent in a forty-year-long investigation of African American men started in the early
1930s. See Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, in
SICKNESS AND HEALTH IN AMERICA 392 (Judith Walzer Leavitt & Ronald L. Numbers eds.,
3d ed. 1997). See generally ALONDRA NELSON, BODY AND SOUL: THE BLACK PANTHER
PARTY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION (2011). Gay rights activists’
advocacy for patients’ rights in connection with the emergence of AIDS in the 1980s is
discussed infra text accompanying notes 236–266.
53. See generally SANDRA MORGEN, INTO OUR OWN HANDS: THE WOMEN’S HEALTH
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1990 (2002); CAROL S. WEISMAN, WOMEN’S
HEALTH CARE: ACTIVIST TRADITIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1998).
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court framed the right to obtain an abortion
as a medical right as well as a privacy right. Id. at 166.
55. See Amy Sue Bix, Engendering Alternatives: Women’s Health Care Choices and Feminist
Medical Rebellions, in THE POLITICS OF HEALING: HISTORIES OF ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY NORTH AMERICA 156–62 (Robert D. Johnston ed., 2004).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 141–148.
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health and disease for laypersons are nothing new; household medical
guides, such as William Buchan’s Domestic Medicine, were extremely popular
as early as the first years of the nineteenth century.57 Nonetheless, for most
of American history, publishers did not seek a mass market for books
containing technical information about the treatments administered and
prescribed by physicians. In the late 1970s, however, the publishing
industry discerned a new profit-making opportunity in the sale of such
volumes to the growing number of highly educated Americans. 58
In 1979, Bantam released the first edition of the The Pill Book, subtitled
The Illustrated Guide to the Most Prescribed Drugs in the United States. The
seventeen printings of the first edition totaled over one million copies.59
The premise of The Pill Book, confirmed by the sales numbers, was that
Americans desired to participate in all aspects of their health care,
including those delivered by doctors. Ever since the release of this volume,
bookstore shelves (and now Amazon search results) have been replete with
books that not only invite consumers into the previously erudite world of
modern pharmaceutical medicine, but also permit and encourage them to
become joint decisionmakers within it. Even the American Medical
Association (AMA) quickly entered this arena, publishing the first edition of
the AMA Family Medical Guide in 1982, with the stated goal of “creat[ing] an
effective partnership with your doctor.”60
For consumers not daunted by more technical language, the Physicians’
Desk Reference (PDR), containing the full physician package insert for every
approved drug, became widely available in regular bookstores shortly after
The Pill Book. In 1981, remarkably, the PDR ranked fourth overall on the B.
Dalton bookstore chain’s national hardcover bestseller list, which contained
both fiction and nonfiction books. 61

57. WILLIAM G. ROTHSTEIN, AMERICAN PHYSICIANS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
33, 42 (1992).
58. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in March 1966, 49.9% of Americans twentyfive years of age and older had completed four years or more of high school and 9.8% had
completed four years or more of college. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, SERIES P-20, NO. 158 (1966), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/1966/P20-158.pdf.
By
March 1981, the corresponding figures were 70% and 17%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
CURRENT
POPULATION
REPORTS:
POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS
(1984),
http://www.census.gov/hhes/
socdemo/education/data/cps/1981/P20-390.pdf.
59. Judith Appelbaum, Paperback Talk; Big Books from Small Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
1982, at Book Rev. 35. The book remains in print today, now in its fifteenth edition.
60. From Random House publisher description (1987).
In 1980, the U.S.
Pharmacopoeia began publishing Advice for the Patient: Drug Information in Lay Language.
61. Leonore Fleischer, Letter from New York: Getting to the Top, WASH. POST, Apr. 19,
1981, at B.W. 12.
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Today, of course, printed books about prescription drugs pale in
significance to the Internet. The Internet revolution has made it easy for
anyone to find detailed medical information, including information about
prescription medications. As early as 1998, more than 14,000 healthrelated websites were online. 62 The attempted taming of this universe of
information began on October 5, 1998, when a young entrepreneur named
Jeffrey Arnold launched WebMD, an Internet portal consolidating health
information for consumers as well as physicians. 63 A decade later, 40
million unique users were visiting WebMD’s network of consumer sites
each month. 64 Moreover, major competitor sites had emerged, including
Yahoo Health, Mayoclinic.com, and About.com Health. 65 Ultimately,
however, advanced search engine technology reduced the importance of
such websites. In a 2012 survey, 35% of American adults reported having
used the Internet specifically to diagnose a medical condition, but many
more of these “online health seekers” started their research using Internet
search engines (77%) than sites specializing in health information (13%). 66
II. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS FOR FOOD
AND DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS
The cultural and societal developments discussed above help illuminate
the FDA regulatory developments explored below—regulatory
developments that themselves likely reinforced these cultural and societal
trends. I will first examine the empowerment of consumers in the realm of
food and dietary supplements and then the same phenomenon with respect
to drugs.
A. Labeling and Standards of Identity
The shift in FA’s perception of the role and capacity of the consumer is
reflected in the legal standard it has used to determine whether a product is
“false or misleading in any particular” and thus misbranded. 67 Prior to
2002, FDA did not clearly state what standard applied, but some of its
62. Mary Huhn, Website has Prescription for Better Health Info, N.Y. POST, Oct. 4, 1998, at
63.
63. Id.
64. Milt Freudenheim, AOL Founder Hopes to Build New Giant Among a Bevy of Health Care
Web Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at C1.
65. Id.
66. Health Online 2013, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 15 2013), http://www.pewinternet.
org/~/media//Files/Reports/PIP_HealthOnline.pdf.
67. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) of 1938 § 403(a), 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(a) (2012) (food); FD&C Act § 502(a), 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2012) (drugs and devices);
FD&C Act § 602, 21 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (cosmetics).
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enforcement actions were clearly designed to protect “gullible” consumers
rather than “reasonable” ones. 68 Court interpretations varied, with some
holding that the law should protect “the ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous,” and others embracing an “ordinary person” standard. 69 In
2002, however, FDA unambiguously declared—at least with respect to
food—that it would use a “reasonable consumer” standard to determine
whether labeling is misleading. 70 The agency explained, “[T]he reasonable
consumer standard more accurately reflects FDA’s belief that consumers
are active partners in their own health care who behave in health
promoting ways when they are given accurate health information.” 71
The rise of the empowered consumer is further illustrated by the
evolution of FDA’s food standard and nutritional labeling policies. As
noted in the introduction, through the late 1960s, FDA’s regulation of the
quality and identity of food depended largely on its use of strict, recipe-style
standards of identity, which it issued pursuant to section 401 of the federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FD&C Act”). 72 The agency strictly
applied the statutory requirement that a variant of a standardized food that
“purported to be” the food must be named with the commercially
This approach inhibited the
poisonous modifier “imitation.” 73
development of substitutes for standardized foods, even health-promoting
substitutes. In 1966, FDA also embraced an extremely strict posture
toward the fortification of food with vitamins and minerals, issuing a rule
that would have drastically limited the number of products that could be
lawfully fortified. 74 Meanwhile, before the 1970s, the FD&C Act as
administered by FDA required relatively little information to appear on
food labels. Manufacturers of standardized foods were not even obligated
to provide a full declaration of ingredients. Furthermore, the agency

68. See, e.g., United States v. An Article . . . Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734 (2d Cir.
1969); United States v. An Article of Food . . . “Manischewitz . . . Diet Thins,” 377 F. Supp.
746 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
69. Compare Sudden Change, 409 F.2d at 740 (“the ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous”), with United States v. 1 Device . . . Radiant Ozone Generator, 1949–50 FDLI
Jud. & Admin. Rec. 139, 143 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (“ordinary person”); see also HUTT, MERRILL
& GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 386–87 n.1.
70. Guidance for Industry: Qualified Health Claims in the Labeling of Conventional
Foods and Dietary Supplements, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,002, 78,003 (Dec. 20, 2002).
71. Id. at 78,004.
72. See generally Richard A. Merrill & Earl M. Collier, Jr., “Like Mother Used to Make”: An
Analysis of FDA Food Standards of Identity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 561 (1974).
73. Id. at 578.
74. Order Staying Effective Date of Regulations, 31 Fed. Reg. 15,730 (Dec. 14, 1966).
This regulation was stayed due to an avalanche of objections, and the resulting mandatory
formal evidentiary hearing extended from 1968 to 1969. Robert W. Hamilton, Rulemaking on
a Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1132, 1146–50 (1972).
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rejected the voluntary use of health claims and also some nutrient content
claims in food labeling. In short, Congress’s and FDA’s approach
significantly confined the variety of foodstuffs available in the market while
also severely limiting the amount of information available to consumers in
food labeling.
A dramatic shift occurred in 1969, at a meeting of experts called the
White House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health. In a section of
the conference report titled “The Provision of Food as it Affects the
Consumer: Guidelines for Federal Action,” the authors rejected FDA’s
restrictive approach to food regulation and issued a clarion call for
consumer choice and information. They advocated an overhaul of FDA
food standards policy so as to “provide maximum flexibility and incentive
for the marketing of new variations and new foods to the public” and
“[w]ider consumer choice of foods.” 75 The authors also concluded that
“[n]o one type of food should be preferred over another as a nutritional
carrier, and therefore fortification of any food should not be prohibited.
The consumer should be free to select . . . any fortified food of her
choice.” 76 Moreover, the report urged: “The label or labeling of a food
should bear whatever information relating to its composition and
nutritional properties is important and useful to consumers, in a form that is
meaningful and usable. Government standards should supplement but not
supplant informative labeling.” 77
A number of participants in the White House Conference began working
at FDA in the early 1970s and proceeded to transform the agency’s
approach to food regulation. 78 The agency stopped issuing new food
standards, made existing standards more flexible, and started permitting
variants of standardized foods to be marketed without the epithet
“imitation” so long as they were not “nutritionally inferior.” 79 FDA also
revised the food standards to mandate disclosure of all optional ingredients,
and it urged voluntary complete ingredient declarations in standardized
foods. 80 In 1973, FDA established a requirement that comprehensive
nutrition labeling be provided, in a standardized format, for any food to
which the manufacturer added a nutrient or about which the manufacturer

75. WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON FOOD, NUTRITION AND HEALTH, FINAL REPORT
122 (1969).
76. Id. at 123.
77. Id. at 120.
78. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 329.
79. Id. at 329, 350–52; Application of Term “Imitation,” 38 Fed. Reg. 2138 (Jan. 19,
1973).
80. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 391–92; Label Designation of
Ingredients for Standardized Foods, 38 Fed. Reg. 2137 (Jan. 19, 1973).
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made a representation about nutrient content. 81 In addition, over the
course of the 1970s, the agency abandoned its highly restrictive approach to
food fortification.
The culmination of this new approach to food regulation was Congress’s
enactment of the Nutrition Labeling Health and Education Act (NLEA) in
1990. 82 This statute required the provision of a uniform “Nutrition Facts”
label on all FDA-regulated food. 83 It tasked FDA with defining nutrient
descriptors (such as “no cholesterol,” “low sodium,” and “reduced fat”).84
Pursuant to its NLEA authority, FDA issued a “generic” standard of
identity, according to which manufacturers may use informative and
appealing names (not including terms such as “imitation” or “substitute”)
for standardized foods that have been reconstituted to satisfy one of these
nutrient descriptors. 85 Perhaps most dramatically, the NLEA authorized
the use of FDA-approved claims (termed “health claims” by the agency)
that characterize the relationship between a food substance and a reduced
risk of a particular disease. 86 Today, largely as a result of these
amendments, a box of Cheerios® often bears detailed nutritional and
health information for the consumer on almost every panel.
The proliferation of health claims in food labeling, along with their
appearance in advertising and other media, has almost surely transformed
the relationship between consumers and food. In 1998, just five years after
FDA published its first set of approved health claims, more than half of
food shoppers reported that their food choices were influenced by their
efforts to reduce the risk of particular health conditions or illnesses. 87
NLEA’s legalization of health claims was even more significant than it
first appeared to be, for it was the issue through which commercial free
speech doctrine—now revolutionizing food and drug law—was introduced

81. Nutrition Labeling, 38 Fed. Reg. 6951 (Mar. 14, 1973). By 1989, about 60% of
FDA-regulated packaged foods bore nutrition labeling pursuant to this rule. HUTT,
MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 403.
82. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104
Stat. 2353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2012)).
83. FD&C Act § 403(q), 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2012).
84. FD&C Act § 403(r), 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1)(D) (2012).
85. Food Standards: Requirements for Foods Named by Use of a Nutrient Content
Claim and a Standardized Term, 58 Fed. Reg. 2431 (Jan. 6, 1993) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 130.10 (2013)).
86. FD&C Act § 403(r), 21 U.S.C. § 343(r) (2012). The agency, which had long treated
the use of such “health claims” as illegal, had already embraced a policy of allowing such
“health claims” in 1985, so as to avoid inconsistency with the FTC’s advertising policies.
MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION
AND HEALTH 241–42 (1st ed., 2002).
87. See National Survey of Consumer Reactions to Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, supra note 51, at
5–6.
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into the field. For a surprisingly long time, the food industry failed to argue
that the regulation of labeling—about half of FDA’s mission—is regulation
of speech implicating the First Amendment. Major food manufacturers,
dependent on FDA’s continuing good will, may simply have been wary
about launching a constitutional attack on the core of the agency’s
authority. But the NLEA health claims regime applies to dietary
supplements as well as conventional food,88 and a pair of pesky supplement
distributors and alternative medicine advocates, Durk Pearson and Sandy
Shaw, did not feel so restrained. Invoking the First Amendment, they
successfully challenged FDA’s rejection of a series of health claims for
which they had petitioned. 89
In its 1999 decision in Pearson v. Shalala, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, applying the Central Hudson 90 analysis applicable to
commercial free speech cases, embraced a vision of the consumer as an
intelligent manager of his or her own health who does not need to be
shielded from accurate information. The court rejected the government’s
assertion that any health claim that does not meet the NLEA’s statutory
standard of “significant scientific agreement” is inherently misleading and
thus, under Central Hudson, ineligible for any First Amendment protection at
all. The court mocked the government’s argument that such claims
are inherently misleading because they have such an awesome impact on
consumers as to make it virtually impossible for them to exercise any
judgment at the point of sale. It would be as if the consumers were asked to buy
something while hypnotized, and therefore they are bound to be misled. We
think this contention is almost frivolous. 91

While acknowledging that prevention of consumer fraud is a “substantial
government interest” that is “directly advanced” by the NLEA health
claims regime, the Pearson court held that FDA’s total ban on claims with
less than “significant scientific agreement” was unreasonable, and thus
unconstitutional, with respect to claims that could be rendered nonmisleading through accurate disclaimers. The court held that the First
Amendment favors disclosure over outright suppression, even in the
commercial realm, and it rejected the notion that “the public is not
sophisticated enough” to be trusted with correct information. 92
This and subsequent decisions impelled the agency to establish a new
88. FD&C Act § 403(r)(5)(D), 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D) (2012). Under the FD&C Act,
the health claims regulations for conventional foods and dietary supplements do not have to
be identical, but FDA has chosen to make them so.
89. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999); 21 C.F.R. § 101.14 (2013).
90. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
91. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 655.
92. Id. at 657 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374–75 (1977)).
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system for reviewing and allowing “qualified health claims” on
conventional foods and dietary supplements—that is, health claims with less
than significant scientific agreement accompanied by adequate
disclaimers. 93 For example, nut labels may now legally declare: “Scientific
evidence suggests but does not prove that eating 1.5 ounces per day of most
nuts [,such as name of specific nut,] as part of a diet low in saturated fat and
cholesterol may reduce the risk of heart disease.” 94 Although FDA asserts
that when it permits such claims, it does so as an exercise of its
“enforcement discretion,” it actually has no choice but to allow them. The
list of permissible “qualified health claims” is now twice as long as the list of
NLEA “unqualified” health claims. 95
B. Social Movements
It is difficult to determine whether and to what extent the particular
regulatory changes discussed above were driven by popular demand as well
as by evolving expert judgment and jurisprudential developments.
Occasionally, however, citizens have mobilized to influence an FDA
decision in a way that leaves no doubt about the importance of public
opinion. The very first mass movements regarding FDA policy that I have
identified occurred during the pivotal decade of the 1970s. They both
concerned food products—vitamin and mineral supplements and the
artificial sweetener saccharin. Nonetheless, their underlying message—that
the public should be free to make its own risk-benefit judgments—would
flow over into the drug arena as well.
In 1966, FDA issued a novel standard of identity for vitamin and mineral
supplements that would have limited the permissible nutrients and their
levels in these products. 96 A deluge of objections triggered an automatic
93. In a later decision in the Pearson litigation, the district court interpreted the court of
appeals decision as holding that a complete ban is constitutional only “when there [is]
almost no qualitative evidence in support of the claim and . . . the government provide[s]
empirical evidence proving that the public would still be deceived even if the claim was
qualified by a disclaimer.” See Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2002).
94. Qualified Health Claims: Letter of Enforcement Discretion—Nuts and Coronary
Heart Disease (Docket No 02P-0505), from Christine Taylor, FDA, to D. J. Soetaert, Pres.,
Int’l Tree Nut Council (July 14, 2003).
95. Compare U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY OF QUALIFIED HEALTH CLAIMS
SUBJECT TO ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/food/ingredients
packaginglabeling/labelingnutrition/ucm073992.htm (last visited May 31, 2014) (listing
twenty-four qualified claims), with 21 C.F.R. § 101 Subpart E (2003) (listing twelve
unqualified claims). In fact, “unqualified” health claims are highly qualified, mandating the
use of the phrase “may reduce the risk of . . . .” Id.
96. Food for Special Dietary Uses, 31 Fed. Reg. 8521, 8523 (June 18, 1966) (codified at
21 C.F.R. § 125.3).
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stay of the rule and the institution of a formal evidentiary hearing. These
objections hardly represented a popular movement; they were submitted
primarily by food and drug manufacturers, trade and professional
organizations, and nutrition experts. 97 In August 1973, after the conclusion
of the hearings, FDA issued a rule in which it continued to use its standard
of identity authority to restrict the nutrients and combinations of nutrients
available in supplements. 98 In addition, the agency declared that the
presence of more than 150% of the Recommended Daily Allowance (RDA)
of a vitamin or mineral would render a supplement a drug and, further,
that the presence of more than designated amounts of vitamin A or vitamin
D would render a supplement a prescription drug. 99
Now, in accordance with the mores of the 1970s, the opposition to FDA
became a genuine social movement, though one supported by industry.
The publication of the proposed rule in December 1972 100 provoked
widespread protest. At the heart of the dissent was a health libertarian
organization, claiming 20,000 members, called the National Health
Federation (NHF).
The NHF choreographed a demonstration in
Washington, D.C. against “Nutritional Tyranny.” 101 The organization’s
alarmist (and inaccurate) warnings that “[t]he Government is going to take
our vitamins away” triggered what the New York Times characterized as a
“massive flow of letters” to Congress. 102 While the first wave of mailings
may have been “financed and directed” by the NHF, 103 the movement took
on a life of its own. By the start of 1974, Congress had received over one
million letters opposing the FDA regulations. Vitamin deregulation was,
along with Watergate, the energy crisis, and the economy, one of the four
issues that generated the most mail to Congress in 1973. 104
In 1974 testimony supporting congressional intervention, David King,
the legislative counsel for the National Nutritional Foods Association, a
health food industry trade group, voiced a regulatory philosophy that
seemed to reflect the views of a broad swath of Americans. Attacking the
provision of the 1973 final rule declaring supplements with more than
97. Protests Delay Restrictions on Marketing of Vitamins, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 18, 1966, at G8.
98. Definitions and Standards of Identity for Food for Special Dietary Use, 38 Fed.
Reg. 20,730 (Aug. 2, 1973) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 80.1).
99. Status of Vitamin A and Vitamin D, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,723 (Aug. 2, 1973) (codified at
21 C.F.R. §§ 3.94–.95).
100. 37 Fed. Reg. 26,618 (Dec. 14, 1972), corrected by 38 Fed. Reg. 799 (Jan. 4, 1973)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 3 (1974)).
101. Nancy L. Ross, Defending the Right To Vitamins and Minerals: Battling the FDA, WASH.
POST, Oct. 30, 1973, at E1.
102. Richard D. Lyons, Disputed Health Lobby Is Pressing for a Bill to Overturn Any Limits on
Sales of Vitamins, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1973, at 17.
103. Id.
104. Of Vitamins, Minerals: Fighting the FDA, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1974, at L5.
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150% RDA potency to be drugs, King opined:
The American concept is that consumers must not only be free to choose, but
free to have that choice uninfluenced by Government interference. . . . This
is particularly true where the Government’s evidence in support of its value
judgment is sharply contested by a number of experts of impeccable
reputation. . . .
. . . As long as he is not dealing with dangerous or untruthfully labeled food,
then risktaking [sic] should be for each man to decide for himself. . . .
. . . What purpose is there in discouraging [a hypothetical arthritis] sufferer
from pursuing his quest for better health? He is a free man. He is not
stupid. . . . It seems to me that this will be a better country if people are
encouraged, rather than discouraged, from interesting themselves in various
approaches to health through better nutrition. 105

Coincidentally, the very next day, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit partially struck down FDA’s vitamin and mineral rule. 106
Two years later, Congress invalidated the remainder by legislation known
as the Vitamin-Mineral Amendments of 1976. 107 The bill’s primary
sponsor, Senator William Proxmire, warned: “What the FDA wants to do is
to strike the views of its stable of orthodox nutritionists into ‘tablets,’ and
bring them down from Mount Sinai where they will be used to regulate the
rights of millions of Americans . . . to take vitamins and minerals.” 108 The
1976 Amendments added FD&C Act § 411, which to this day virtually
eliminates the agency’s power to regulate the potency and composition of
vitamin-mineral supplement products. 109 The legislation passed the House
of Representatives without a dissenting vote and passed the Senate by voice
vote. 110
A similar story would unfold in the early 1990s, when in response to
FDA efforts to strictly regulate claims for all types of dietary supplements,
Congress passed the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act
(DSHEA) of 1994. 111 FDA proposed in 1991 to subject dietary supplement
105. Food Supplement Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor
& Pub. Welfare, 93rd Cong. 850–51 (1974) (statement of David King, Legislative Counsel,
National Nutritional Foods Association). Another witness, John Matonis, contended that
FDA’s rule violated the U.S. Constitution, namely, the Ninth Amendment and, perhaps, the
principles of Roe v. Wade; however, he only cited to Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Roe,
which had been decided the previous year. Id. at 886 (statement of John Matonis).
106. Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974).
107. Pub. L. No. 94-278, 90 Stat. 401 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350 (2012)).
108. 121 Cong. Rec. S39,980 (1975).
109. FD&C Act § 411, 21 U.S.C. § 350 (2012).
110. Congress Blocks Efforts by F.D.A. To Curb Vitamins, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1976, at 16.
111. For a general description of these events, see PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING
AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION
283–89 (2003).

648

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

[66:3

health claims to the same rigorous “significant scientific agreement”
standard that the NLEA imposed on such claims for conventional foods. 112
Supplement manufacturers responded by generating apprehension among
their devoted customers—a task made easier by FDA’s widely publicized
armed raid of an alternative medicine clinic in May 1992. 113 A flood of
irate letters motivated Congress to impose a one-year moratorium on the
application of the NLEA to supplements. 114 When, following the
moratorium, the agency published effectively the same proposal, 115 public
outrage reached a fever pitch. 116 Just as in the mid-1970s, those fomenting
opposition (in this case, the supplement industry) ominously and
inaccurately warned: “Write to Congress today or kiss your supplements
goodbye!” 117 Once again, citizens supporting freedom to choose their
supplements signed petitions, attended demonstrations, and mailed an
“avalanche” of letters to their senators and representatives. 118 Dietary
supplements were the leading topic in mail received by Congress during
that session. 119 Congressional hearings with paeans to “freedom of choice”
culminated in the passage of DSHEA, which limited (although it certainly
did not eliminate) FDA’s authority to regulate supplement safety and
labeling. DSHEA gave birth to the modern dietary supplement industry,
which markets products of every imaginable origin bearing not only FDAcleared health claims, but also un-reviewed disease prevention and
treatment claims barely disguised as legal “structure/function” claims. 120
The second mass protest against FDA in the 1970s concerned its
proposal to revoke the interim food additive approval for the artificial
sweetener saccharin. 121 After studies demonstrated carcinogenicity in rats,
the agency did not have significant discretion in the matter, for the FD&C
Act’s Delaney Clause states that “no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it

112. Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,537,
60,539 (Nov. 27, 1991).
113. Lena Williams, F.D.A. Steps Up Effort to Control Vitamin Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1992.
114. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491, 4500
(1992).
115. Food Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Dietary Supplements,
58 Fed. Reg. 33,700 (June 18, 1993).
116. See Michael Weisskopf, In the Vitamin Wars, Industry Marshals an Army of Citizen
Protesters, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1993, at A7.
117. Id.
118. See John Schwartz, Next Week, FDA Will Take Vitamins: Lawmakers Get Avalanche of
Letters About Agency’s Regulation of Dietary Supplements, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1993, at A23.
119. Id.
120. See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 443–51.
121. Saccharin and Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996 (Apr. 15, 1977).
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is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal.” 122 After
publishing the proposed rule revoking the approval, however, the agency
reported that “the protest is stronger and louder than any response in
recent history.” 123 If the ban on saccharin went through, no artificial
sweeteners would remain on the market.124 Outraged citizens included not
only diabetics (and their physicians), but also millions of people who drank
diet soda to control their weight or simply because they enjoyed it. 125 A
Harris survey found that Americans opposed the saccharin ban by a 76%
to 15% majority. 126 Worried consumers began to hoard diet soft drinks. 127
The front page of the Chicago Tribune declared “This may be the year when
consumers begin protesting consumer protection, and the ‘man on the
street’ splits with the Ralph Nader-styled organizational consumer.” 128
As it had in the vitamin-mineral supplement controversy, Congress
stepped in. It enacted legislation in 1977 to suspend FDA’s prohibition of
saccharin. 129 The statute also, however, required the labels and labeling of
food containing saccharin, and signs in stores selling such food, to warn:
“USE OF THIS PRODUCT MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR
HEALTH. THIS PRODUCT CONTAINS SACCHARIN WHICH HAS
BEEN DETERMINED TO CAUSE CANCER IN LABORATORY
ANIMALS.” 130 This solution represented an emerging new approach;
consumers should, in certain instances, be made aware of the risks of a
product but should be free to use it anyway if they decided that its
perceived benefits outweighed these risks. Such views cut across party lines.
Democrat Edward Kennedy, the liberal lion of the Senate, and Republican
Richard Schweiker, one of the body’s more conservative members,

122. FD&C Act § 409(c)(3)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2012); see also HUTT, MERRILL
& GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 1376–79 (describing the legislative history of the clause,
named after U.S. Representative James Delaney).
123. Christine Winter, Bitter Days Ahead? Consumers Protest Life Sans Saccharin, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 17, 1977, at A1.
124. FDA had removed cyclamate from the Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS) list in
1969. Cyclamic Acid and Its Salts, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,063 (Oct. 21, 1969).
125. See Winter, supra note 123.
126. Louis Harris, 76 Per Cent [sic] Majority Opposes Ban on Saccharin, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21,
1977, at B3. In the same survey, a 47 to 37 percent plurality agreed that “there is too much
government regulation of consumer products, and the FDA is just overprotecting the
public.” Id.
127. Winter, supra note 123.
128. Id.
129. Saccharin Study and Labeling Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-203, 91 Stat. 1451.
130. FD&C Act § 403(o)–(p). Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-73 (2000). Based on
accumulated scientific tests demonstrating that saccharin was not carcinogenic in people,
Congress repealed § 403(o), the labeling requirement, in 2000. 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-73
(2000). Congress repealed § 403(p) in 1996.
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cosponsored the saccharin-saving legislation. 131 It passed the Senate by a
vote of 87 to 7. 132 In explaining his support for the legislation, Kennedy
remarked on the “profound public health and public policy dilemmas”
raised by the saccharin controversy.
If a substance has both benefits and risks, who should decide whether the risk
should be taken—the Federal Government or the individual? What is the
appropriate role of a Federal health regulatory agency? Is it to provide
individuals with sufficient information to enable them to make their own
judgments, or is it to protect individuals on the basis of its best scientific
evaluation? 133

Kennedy concluded, in light of saccharin’s benefits and the division of
opinion regarding its safety, that “the individual is in the best position to
decide for himself or herself whether they [sic] want to expose themselves
or their children to saccharin use.” 134
As described below, echoes of such rhetoric were simultaneously being
heard in the increasingly vociferous demands made by advocates for access
to drugs to treat serious illnesses.
III. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS FOR DRUGS
A

Labeling and Advertising

The consumer’s relationship to drugs obviously differs from his or her
relationship to food. An ill person is vulnerable almost by definition, and
he or she is thus more likely to seek expert advice and professional
assistance. Moreover, the science of medicine seems more complex and
inaccessible to the average person than does the science of nutrition.
Finally, as a practical matter, contemporary health care routinely involves
drugs and devices that a patient cannot use without professional
intervention. Nevertheless, even within the world of modern orthodox
medicine, a consumer can assume a range of roles, from a passive subject of
131. Schweiker scored only a 15% rating from the liberal Americans for Democratic
Action in 1977. Health and Human Services: Richard Schultz Schweiker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1980, at A29.
132. 123 Cong. Rec. S29,395 (1977). Kennedy ultimately voted against the bill because
he opposed some detail of its final form.
133. Id. at 29,352.
134. Id.; see also Saccharin Ban and Food Safety Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Health and
Scientific Research of the S. Comm. On Labor and Human Res., 96th Cong. 22 (1979) (statement of
Dr. Joyce McCann, Dept. of Biochemistry, Univ. of Cal., Berkely) (“Saccharin is primarily a
public opinion issue, and I think that is a respectable thing for it to be, frankly.”). Id.
McCann continued by noting that a decision not to ban the sweetener would not be a
scientific decision, but “may well be based on the fact that people want it, want to be able to
take a risk, and I see nothing wrong with that.” Id.
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a physician’s ministrations to an informed and empowered participant in
one’s own treatment. The last half century has witnessed a general shift
from the former to the latter.
This development is reflected in FDA’s regulation of the information
provided to patients about prescription drugs. A patient cannot exercise
significant agency in the decision to use a prescription drug unless she has
detailed facts about the medication. As discussed above, information about
prescription drugs has in recent years become markedly more accessible to
ordinary consumers through mass-market publications and the Internet. In
this section, I will discuss how the past few decades have also seen an almost
revolutionary shift in FDA’s policies about patient labeling and DTC
advertising of prescription drugs.
The older, submissive understanding of the patient’s role is well
illustrated by an FDA rule issued shortly after the passage of the FD&C Act
in 1938. Although the statute did not establish compulsory prescription
status, the agency effectively created a category of mandatory prescription
drugs through regulations implementing the law. 135 The agency issued a
rule providing, in effect, that a prescription drug was misbranded unless “all
representations or suggestions contained in the labeling thereof with respect
to the conditions for which such drug . . . is to be used appear only in such
medical terms as are not likely to be understood by the ordinary
individual.”136 In other words, it was illegal to sell a prescription drug with
labeling that a layman could easily comprehend!
In 1951, Congress codified compulsory prescription status in the
Durham-Humphrey Amendments to the FD&C Act. 137 Neither these
Amendments nor the regulations FDA issued pursuant to them contained
the “keep the patient in the dark” requirement of the 1938 rule. 138
Nonetheless, the agency maintained its position that prescription drug
information should be directed only to physicians and other medical
professionals. Indeed, for many years, FDA deemed it to be illegal for a
manufacturer to provide a prescription drug’s approved physician labeling
to a layperson. 139 FDA did not mandate any type of patient-directed

135. See Peter Temin, The Origin of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J.L. & ECON. 91 (1979).
136. 21 C.F.R. § 2.106(b)(2) (Supp. 1938) (emphasis added).
137. Pub. L. No. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648 (codified at FD&C Act § 503(b), 21 U.S.C.
§ 353(b) (2012)).
138. 21 C.F.R. § 2.106; Drugs and Devices; Directions for Use; Exemption from
Prescription Requirements, 17 Fed. Reg. 6818 (July 25, 1952) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 1.106(b)(2) (1954)).
139. Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, FDA Chief Counsel from 1971–1975; Katherine
A. Helm, Protecting Public Health from Outside the Physician’s Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from
Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 117, 125 (2007).
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labeling for prescription drugs until 1968, when it required a two sentence
warning statement to appear on the container of a self-administered
inhalation drug product. 140
Patient labeling for prescription drugs became a matter of public debate
in 1970, when FDA proposed to require patient package inserts for oral
contraceptives. These inserts would set out, “in lay language,” the risks and
possible side effects associated with the use of “the pill.” 141 The wording of
the proposed rule itself reveals the caution with which the agency took this
then-revolutionary action.
[T]he administration has reviewed the oral contraceptive products, taking
into account the following factors: the products contain potent steroid
hormones which affect many organ systems; they are used for long periods of
time by large numbers of women who, for the most part, are healthy and
take them as a matter of choice . . . in full knowledge of other means of
contraception; and because of their indications they are sometimes used
without adequate medical supervision. They represent, therefore, the
prototype of drugs for which well-founded patient information is desirable.
. . . The Commissioner . . . is aware that this represents a departure from the
traditional approach to the dissemination of information regarding
prescription drugs via the doctor/patient relationship, and stresses that it is
not intended to weaken or replace that channel, but rather because of the
unusual pattern of use by [sic] these drugs, to reinforce the efforts of the
physician to inform the patient in a balanced fashion of the risks attendant
upon the use of oral contraceptives. 142

FDA did not persuade the medical establishment that patient labeling
was appropriate, even for this product. Organized medicine’s opposition
reflected its traditional view of patients as passive recipients of doctors’
beneficent care. In comments it submitted to the agency, the AMA and
other mainstream medical groups contended that FDA’s proposal would
“interfere with the physician-patient relationship” and “confuse and alarm
the patient to the extent that persons who should take the drugs for health
reasons would not do so.” 143 According to the medical organizations,
“[T]he physician is the proper person to provide [this] kind of information
to his own patient on an individualized, need-to-know, basis.” 144 Despite this

140. Isoproterenol Inhalation Preparations for Human Use; Warnings, 33 Fed. Reg.
8812 (June 18, 1968). The warning told the patient not to exceed the prescribed dose and to
contact a physician immediately if breathing difficulty persisted. Id.
141. Proposed Statement of Policy Concerning Oral Contraceptive Labeling Directed to
Laymen, 35 Fed. Reg. 5962 (Apr. 10, 1970).
142. Id.
143. Statement of Policy Concerning Oral Contraceptive Labeling Directed to Users, 35
Fed. Reg. 9001, 9001 (June 11, 1970).
144. Id. (emphasis added).
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resistance, FDA issued a modified version of the oral contraceptive patient
labeling requirement as a final rule. 145
Seven years later, FDA proposed a patient package insert requirement
for another category of obstetrical/gynecological products, namely, drugs
containing estrogen for use by menopausal women.146 This time, organized
medical groups—along with the leading prescription drug trade
association—not only filed comments opposing the proposed rule, but also
challenged the final rule in court. They contended that the regulation was
an unconstitutional interference with the practice of medicine. In 1980, a
U.S. District Court rejected this argument. 147 After observing that
physicians remained free to say whatever they wanted to their patients
about the use of estrogens and the accuracy of the compulsory labeling, the
court continued:
[I]t becomes apparent that the plaintiffs urge recognition not of a right to
exercise judgment in prescribing treatment, but rather of a right to control
patient access to information. . . . There simply is no constitutional basis for
recognition of a right on the part of physicians to control patient access to
information concerning the possible side effects of prescription drugs. . . .
The physician rights discussed [in cases cited by the plaintiffs] are . . .
derivative of patient rights and do not exist independent of those rights. . . .
The patient rights recognized in the line of cases relied upon by plaintiffs flow
from a constitutionally protected right of privacy. . . . To the extent these
cases have any bearing on the present issue, then, their rationale would
appear to support the challenged regulation. The objective of that regulation
is to provide the patient with the facts relevant to a choice about the use, and
manner of use, of estrogen drugs. The asserted right to limit patient access to
such information can hardly be said to facilitate the patient’s “interest in
independence” in decision making. 148

By the end of the 1970s, FDA was a firm proponent of patient labeling.
In 1979, the agency proposed regulations that would have required
manufacturers to prepare patient package inserts (PPIs), written in
“nontechnical language,” for most prescription drug products. The
proposed labeling would have provided patients with much of the
information contained in the FDA-approved physician labeling and would
have been drafted by the drug companies based on guidelines prepared by
the agency. The dispensers of prescription drugs, whether pharmacies or
physicians, would have been obligated to provide the labeling to each
145. Id. at 9002 (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 310.501).
146. Requirement of Labeling Directed to the Patient, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,636 (July 22,
1977) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 310.515).
147. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. FDA, 484 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Del. 1980), aff’d per curiam, 634
F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1980).
148. Id. at 1188–89.
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patient. 149 The agency promoted the rule as advancing patients’ rights as
well as the public health. “This action is being taken,” the agency
explained in the preamble, “because FDA believes that prescription drug
labeling that is directed to patients will promote the safe and effective use of
prescription drug products and that patients have a right to know about the
benefits, risks, and directions for use of the products.” 150 The agency
remarked: “Although patient interest in patient labeling has been expressed
most forcefully by consumer activists, FDA believes that the activists’ views
reflect accurately broad patient support for patient labeling.” 151
In 1980, FDA established a three-year pilot program requiring the
preparation and distribution of patient package inserts for ten high-priority
classes of prescription drugs. 152 Shortly after President Ronald Reagan
took office in 1981, FDA stayed the effective date of this mandatory PPI
program, and in 1982, following a year of procedural wrangling, the agency
revoked the rule altogether. 153 Notably, however, FDA’s actions did not
reflect a newfound resistance to the very notion of patient labeling for
prescription drugs; to the contrary, the agency affirmed that “patients have
both a right and a need to know about the drugs they use.” 154 Rather,
reflecting the new administration’s emphasis on privatization and
efficiency, FDA based its revocation of the rule on its determination that
patients could be provided with information about prescription drugs more
effectively and efficiently by the private sector, which had already
commenced various initiatives in this area. 155
In 1995, FDA, expressing concern that “[i]nadequate access to
appropriate patient information is a major cause of inappropriate use of
prescription medications, resulting in serious personal injury,” proposed to
establish a new, limited program for mandatory patient-directed

149. Prescription Drug Products: Patient Labeling Requirements, 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016
(July 6, 1979).
150. Id. The mandated labeling would have informed patients that the full physician
labeling was available from their pharmacist or doctor. The agency explained that this
information was required because “[m]any persons, including some pharmacists and
physicians, erroneously believe that State or Federal law prohibits providing a drug product’s
official package insert to patients.” Id. at 40,029 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 40,020. The preamble provided poll information supporting this conclusion.
Id. at 40,020–21.
152. Prescription Drug Products; Patient Package Inserts Requirements, 45 Fed. Reg.
60,754, 60,757 (Sept. 12, 1980).
153. Prescription Drug Products; Revocation of Patient Package Insert Requirements,
47 Fed. Reg. 39,147 (Sept. 7, 1982).
154. Id. at 39,148.
155. Prescription Drug Products; Proposal to Revoke Patient Package Inserts
Requirements, 47 Fed. Reg. 7458, 7459 (Feb. 19, 1982).
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“Medication Guides,” or “MedGuides.” 156 The agency finalized this rule
in 1998. 157 The regulation defines a medication guide as “FDA-approved
patient labeling”; in effect, it is a patient package insert by a different
name. 158 The MedGuide requirement is far from universal; it is intended
to apply only to “certain products that pose a serious and significant public
health concern requiring immediate distribution of FDA-approved patient
information.” 159 In the preamble to the final regulation, FDA estimated
that it would mandate a medication guide for only five to ten drugs per
year. For the next decade, the agency stayed at the lower end of this
estimate.
In 2007, however, the passage of the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act (FDAAA) triggered a new wave of MedGuides.
FDAAA’s “Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy” (REMS) provisions
state that the agency may, as part of such a strategy, require the
dissemination of either “a Medication Guide, as provided for under [21
C.F.R.] part 208” or “a patient package insert.” 160 In practice, MedGuides
have become by far the most common element—and frequently the only
element—of REMS. 161 Almost 200 REMS with MedGuide requirements
have been established since 2007. 162
156. Prescription Drug Product Labeling; Medication Guide Requirements, 60 Fed.
Reg. 44,182, 44,199 (Aug. 24, 1995).
157. Prescription Drug Product Labeling; Medication Guide Requirements, 63 Fed.
Reg. 66,378 (Dec. 1, 1998) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 208).
158. 21 C.F.R. § 208.3(h) (1999). At 21 C.F.R. § 208.20, the rule establishes general
requirements for the content and format of a medication guide.
159. Prescription Drug Product Labeling; Medication Guide Requirements, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 44,184 (Aug. 24, 1995). Under the rule, the agency will mandate a MedGuide only
in the following circumstances: “(1) The drug product is one for which patient labeling could
help prevent serious adverse effects. (2) The drug product is one that has serious risk(s)
(relative to benefits) of which patients should be made aware because information
concerning the risk(s) could affect patients’ decision to use, or to continue to use the product.
(3) The drug product is important to health and patient adherence to directions for use is
crucial to the drug’s effectiveness.” 21 C.F.R. § 208.1(c) (1999).
160. FD&C Act § 505-1(e)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(e)(2) (2012).
161. FDA observed in 2011: “Between March 25, 2008, when the [Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy] REMS provisions of [Food and Drug Administration Act] FDAAA
took effect and January 1, 2011, FDA has approved over 150 Medication Guides for
products approved under new drug applications (NDAs) and biologic license applications
(BLAs) as part of a REMS. One hundred and eight of these REMS included only a
Medication Guide . . . .” U.S. FOOD AND DRUG. ADMIN., GUIDANCE, MEDICATION
GUIDES—DISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS AND INCLUSION IN RISK EVALUATION AND
MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS) 4 (2011).
162. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION
STRATEGIES (REMS), FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/postmarket
drugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/ucm111350.htm#Releases (last visited Apr.
18, 2014). My examination of the data on this site determined that 192 REMS have
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FDA’s policy regarding whether manufacturers may provide information
about off-label (i.e., unapproved) uses of drugs similarly reflects the
evolution of the agency’s perception of drug consumers. FDA views the
distribution of such information to be illegal under the FD&C Act in most
circumstances. But in the agency’s own words, “[F]irms can respond to
unsolicited requests for information about FDA-regulated medical products
by providing truthful, balanced, non-misleading, and non-promotional
scientific or medical information that is responsive to the specific request,
even if responding . . . requires a firm to provide information on
unapproved . . . indications or conditions of use.” 163 Until recently, this
policy appeared to cover only inquiries from physicians and other
healthcare professionals. 164 In 2011, however, FDA issued a new draft
guidance document regarding unsolicited requests for off-label information
which—though presented as a continuation of previous policy—clearly
states that any person or entity that is completely independent from the
responding company may make such a request, including “consumers such
as patients and caregivers.” 165 Furthermore, regardless of the recipient of
the information, FDA maintains that the response “should be scientific in
nature” and that it “should include complete copies of scientific reprints,
technical literature, or other scientific and medical information responsive
to the request . . . .” 166
This little-noticed inclusion of consumers on the list of people eligible to
receive scientific information from companies about unapproved uses of drugs
and devices illustrates just how far FDA has journeyed away from its 1960s
vision of patients as unsophisticated, passive, and preferably ignorant
recipients of health care.

included MedGuides. FDA may still compel the use of a MedGuide under part 208
separately from the imposition of a REMS. Id. at 4. In fact, however, REMS have become
the new standard vehicle for mandating patient labeling of a prescription drug.
163. FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: RESPONDING TO UNSOLICITED
REQUESTS FOR OFF-LABEL INFORMATION ABOUT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL
DEVICES 6 (2011).
164. See, e.g., Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration’s Policy on
Promotion of Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs and Devices; Request for Comments,
59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,823 (Nov. 18, 1994) (“Under current FDA policy, companies may
also disseminate information on unapproved uses in response to unsolicited requests for
scientific information from health care professionals.”). In addition, § 557(a) of the FD&C
Act, which was added in 1997 and expired on September 30, 2006, provided that “nothing
in section 551 [of the Act] shall be construed as prohibiting a manufacturer from
disseminating information in response to an unsolicited request from a health care practitioner.”
21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-6 (2012) (emphasis added); see also DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 163, at
n.9.
165. DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 163, at 4.
166. Id. at 8.
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B. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
Neither the FD&C Act nor FDA regulations have ever expressly
prohibited direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising of prescription drugs.
Nonetheless, until the early 1980s, no drug manufacturer had ever
promoted such a product directly to consumers. In fact, the industry
viewed the practice as “inconceivable.” 167 As one scholar has noted:
From a historical perspective, the concept of promoting prescription drugs
directly to the ultimate consumer, the patient, has a distinctly radical element
to it. . . . DTC advertising and promotion . . . undermine our most historic
principles of disease management and professional relations. Since there
have been physicians, there has been a mystique about how they manage
disease. . . . This attitude extends to the products prescribed or used by the
physician. 168

The majority of doctors, including physicians within FDA, considered
DTC advertising of prescription drugs to be simply inappropriate. 169
According to surveys conducted in 1984, 69% of physicians were opposed
to all DTC prescription drug advertising and 84% opposed such
advertising on television. 170 Many doctors believed that DTC promotion
would interfere with the physician-patient relationship. 171 Indeed, when
FDA first proposed to allow the advertising merely of prescription drug
prices directly to consumers, it received comments “express[ing] concern
that encouragement of prescription drug price advertising would promote
self-medication and self-prescribing and lead to drug abuse and misuse by
consumers who pressure their physicians to prescribe larger quantities and
cheaper drugs.” 172
Drug companies, satisfied with their well-established channels of
promotion to physicians, generally agreed that DTC advertising was
Moreover, manufactures widely assumed that DTC
improper. 173

167. Andrea W. Trento, American Exceptionalism and Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Structural
and Philosophical Impediments to Reform in Europe, Harvard Law School Third Year Paper 1, 4
(2002), http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/8965601.
168. Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 54 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 489, 489 (1999).
169. Id. at 492.
170. Louis A. Morris et al., The Attitudes of Consumers toward Direct Advertising of Prescription
Drugs, 10 PUB. HEALTH REPORTS 82, 84 (1986).
171. See Pines, supra note 168, at 509 (discussing American Medical Society (AMA)
opposition to direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising in the 1980s).
172. Reminder Labeling and Reminder Advertisements for Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed.
Reg. 58,794, 58,798 (Dec. 18, 1975).
173. In 1984, Upjohn, which opposed DTC advertising at the time, sponsored a major
conference on the subject in which speakers expressed concerns about the practice and its
impact on consumers. Pines, supra note 168, at 493.
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advertising campaigns would not work in any event. They believed that a
DTC campaign for a prescription drug would be “suicidal” because
“doctors never would accept a program that bypassed them.” 174
Despite these forces aligned against DTC advertising, two direct-toconsumer advertisements appeared in print publications in the early
1980s. 175 Then, in February 1982, FDA Commissioner Arthur Hull Hayes,
Jr. delivered a speech to the Pharmaceutical Advertising Council that has
been characterized as perhaps “the single most important speech ever made
by a commissioner.”176 In this address, Hayes predicted “exponential
growth” in DTC advertising and thus unintentionally sent a signal that
FDA would be open to such promotion. 177 The agency soon began
receiving numerous proposed DTC advertisements.178 In September 1982,
Hayes, concerned that DTC advertising of prescription drugs had not been
adequately researched or discussed, requested a voluntary moratorium on
the practice “in order to permit time for a reasoned assessment of this
complex issue.” 179
Two years later, in 1985, FDA reached its verdict; new Commissioner
Frank E. Young withdrew the moratorium. 180 DTC advertising of
prescription drugs soon burgeoned. In 1989, approximately $12 million
was expended on such promotion; by 1996, this number was $595.5
million. 181 The saturation of American popular culture with prescription
drug advertising surged again in 1997, when FDA issued a draft guidance
effectively allowing television spots for the first time.182 By 2005, DTC
174. Pines, supra note 168, at 491.
175. See id. (contrasting FDA’s reactions to an ibuprofen price advertisement and an
advertisement for a flu vaccine); see also Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription
Drugs; Withdrawal of Moratorium, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,677, 36,677 (Sept. 9, 1985) (lifting the
moratorium on direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertising); Morris et al., supra note
170, at 83 (highlighting how various drug manufacturers began to use advertisements to
encourage care for under-diagnosed conditions and to gain consumer trust).
176. Pines, supra note 168, at 492.
177. Id.
178. Id. (describing the flood of advertisements sent to the Division of Drug Advertising
and Labeling); Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs; Withdrawal of
Moratorium, 50 Fed. Reg. at 36,677 (explaining how drug manufacturers had indicated to
FDA after the Commissioner’s speech that they already had or were developing consumer
advertising campaigns prior to the speech).
179. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 915; Pines, supra note 168, at 492.
180. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs; Withdrawal of
Moratorium, 50 Fed. Reg. at 36,677.
181. Pines, supra note 168, at 493; AM. PHARM. ASS’N & PREVENTION MAGAZINE,
NAVIGATING THE MEDICATION MARKETPLACE: HOW CONSUMERS CHOOSE 23 (1997).
182. Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements;
Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171, 43,171 (Aug. 12, 1997) (outlining the requirements for
consumer-directed broadcast advertising of prescription drugs). By 2000, expenditures for
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advertising of prescription drugs had become a $4.1 billion business. 183
With the growth of DTC advertising for prescription drugs, the public
was bombarded not merely by promotional puffery (although industry
critics perceived much of this), but also by accurate scientific information.
Section 502(n) of the FD&C Act, enacted in 1962, has always mandated
that prescription drug advertisements contain “information in brief
summary relating to side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness as shall
be required in regulations . . . .” 184 In practice, the “brief summaries” in
the advertisements appearing in professional journals were fairly detailed
synopses of the approved physician labeling. And when FDA lifted the
moratorium on DTC advertising in 1985, it announced that the agency
would “continue to regulate prescription drug advertising, regardless of its
intended audience, in accordance with section 502(n) . . . and the
Therefore, to this day, almost all
implementing regulations.” 185
prescription drug advertisements in general interest magazines and
newspapers, as in professional journals, include an entire separate page of
technical information about the drug presented in nonpromotional
language. 186 Moreover, FDA research shows that almost half of consumers
read all or most of these brief summaries in the print advertisements for
drugs in which they are especially interested. 187
Why did FDA alter its stance on DTC advertising in 1985, thus opening
the floodgates for direct promotion of prescription drugs to consumers?
According to the recollections of Wayne Pines, an FDA insider at the time,
the change did not reflect any evolution in the thinking of medical
professionals or drug manufacturers. 188 The agency’s actions were, instead,
television advertising alone soared to $1.574 billion. Trento, supra note 167, at text
accompanying notes 41–43.
183. Rich Thomaselli, Ten Years Later: Direct to Consumer Drug Advertising, ADVERTISING
AGE (Oct. 1, 2006), http://www.adage.com/article/news/ten-years-direct-consumer-drugadvertising/112215/.
184. In turn, FDA’s regulations issued pursuant to this provision repeat this language
and add that “side effects [and] contraindications . . . include side effects, warnings,
precautions, and contraindications and include any such information under such headings
as cautions, special considerations, important notes, etc. . . . .” 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1)
(2013).
185. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs; Withdrawal of
Moratorium, 50 Fed. Reg. at 36,678.
186. An exception to this rule exists for “reminder advertisements” that advertise the
name of a drug but do not include any information about the uses of the drug. 21 C.F.R.
§ 202.1(e)(2)(i) (2013).
187. KATHRYN J. AIKIN ET AL., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN
ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH DTC PROMOTION OF PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS: SUMMARY OF FDA SURVEY RESEARCH RESULTS 24–25 (2004).
188. In the 1990s, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
unambiguously embraced DTC advertising, and the American Medical Association
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a response to consumer preferences.189 A 1984 study conducted by FDA
itself was particularly influential. In this study, two-thirds of consumers
opined that DTC advertising would provide them with useful information
and 61% agreed that they “would like to see advertisements for prescription
drugs.” 190 Andrea W. Trento has ascribed the emergence of DTC
advertising to a “philosophical change” that occurred between the 1960s
and early 1980s—the rise of “the principle of patient autonomy and the
doctrine of informed consent,” which “trump[ed] the pre-existing dogma
that patients must rely on trust in the benevolence of physicians for
understanding, treatment, and personal coping with their diseases.”191
For more than a decade after FDA sanctioned the use of DTC print
advertisements, television ads remained extremely scarce. Drug companies
could satisfy the “brief summary” requirement on television only by
scrolling through the entire text, an approach that was affordable only after
midnight.
In fact, FDA regulations have long allowed broadcast
advertisements, as an alternative to including the entire brief summary, to
make “adequate provision . . . for dissemination of the approved or
permitted package labeling in connection with the broadcast
presentation.” 192 Until FDA disseminated the 1997 draft guidance
document mentioned above, however, the agency had never acknowledged
an “adequate” method for disseminating this labeling. In the 1997 draft
guidance and the 1999 final version, FDA set forth a set of acceptable steps
an advertiser can take to comply with the “adequate provision”
requirement, including, for example, providing a web address, a toll-free
number, and a reference to a contemporaneously available print
advertisement. 193
In a sense, FDA’s acceptance of television advertisements represented a
greater demonstration of faith in the consumer than did its allowance of
DTC print advertisements; the broadcast guidance treated the consumer
not just as a capable processor of information, but also as an active seeker of
officially accepted it, though with reservations. Pines, supra note 168, at 508–09.
189. Pines, supra note 168, at 491–92 (noting consumers were more educated and
involved in making health care decisions for themselves than ever before).
190. See Morris et al. supra note 170, at 86. Consumers at the time appear to have been
much more resistant to television advertising of prescription drugs than print advertising; in
the same study, 44% of respondents agreed with the statement “I think television
commercials for prescription drugs would be a bad idea.” Id.; see also Pines, supra note 168,
at 492 (this study “shaped FDA’s thinking at the time about DTC advertising”).
191. Trento supra note 167, at text accompanying note 22–26.
192. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1).
193. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA:
CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS 3–4 (1997); U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS
2–3 (1999).
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it. And consumers have lived up to this vision, at least to some extent. In
2004, an FDA-sponsored survey examined how frequently viewers of
broadcast prescription drug advertisements subsequently sought full
product information through the toll-free telephone number, company
website, or referenced magazine. The study’s authors concluded: “It
appears that a substantial portion of patients use these methods to gather
information, consistent with the original intent of the adequate provision
requirement.” 194
None of this is to say that consumers obtain a balanced and accurate
view of prescription drugs from television commercials, nor that they are
capable of fully comprehending the more detailed information they may
obtain from other sources after viewing such ads; scholars have challenged
both of these assumptions. 195 What is certain is that the introduction of
prescription drug television commercials, a phenomenon that never would
have occurred without an evolution in FDA’s perception of the consumer,
itself has revolutionized the relationship between consumers and
prescription drug products.
Notably, DTC advertising has also transformed the relationship between
drug consumers and prescribing doctors. 196 In the 2004 FDA survey, 85%
of physicians stated that their patients often asked them about prescription
drugs, and they overwhelmingly reported that these questions had
increased in frequency since the introduction of broadcast
Most of these patient-initiated discussions about
advertisements. 197
prescription drugs concerned particular brand name products, which
patients routinely asked their doctors to prescribe. 198 One can only imagine
how outlandish such interactions would seem to a doctor of the 1950s.
The rise of DTC advertising for prescription drugs is an American story.
Only one other nation in the world—New Zealand—permits the
manufacturers of these products to trumpet their efficacy directly to
consumers. 199
194. AIKIN ET AL., supra note 187, at 87.
195. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Kaphingst & William DeJong, The Educational Potential of Directto-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 23 HEALTH AFF. 143 (2004).
196. AIKIN ET AL., supra note 187, at 26–27. Consumers most commonly sought such
information by talking with a doctor or other medical professional, but they also frequently
performed research in a reference book or on the Internet. Id.
197. Id. at 55–57.
198. Id. at 64–65.
199. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Under Fire, 87 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 576, 576
(2009). Canada allows advertisements that mention the name of a product without
reference to indications or effectiveness and advertisements that mention diseases and the
existence of unspecified treatments, but not advertisements that combine the brand name of
a prescription drug with claims about indication or effectiveness. Steven G. Morgan, DirectTo-Consumer Advertising and Expenditures on Prescription Drugs: A Comparison of Experiences in the
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C. Prescription versus OTC Status
Another factor within FDA’s zone of authority that greatly affects the
respective roles of patient and doctor is a drug’s status as either a
prescription (Rx) or over-the-counter (OTC) product. During the past
several decades, an enormous, FDA-enabled migration of important drugs
from prescription to OTC status has occurred. This development has had
dramatic implications for consumer empowerment. A person obviously has
more direct control over her body and health if she can access an effective
remedy without a prescription. Viewed more broadly, the OTC switch
phenomenon represents a tidal shift of authority away from the medical
profession and toward the consumer. Every decision by FDA to allow a
formerly prescription-status drug to be sold over-the-counter is premised on
a set of conclusions about the consumer population as well as about the
drug itself—namely, that most consumers are competent, with the
assistance of adequate labeling, to accurately diagnose the condition at issue
and to safely and effectively treat themselves with the product most of the
time.
Rx-OTC switches have occurred in three waves. The first spate of
switches was implemented by FDA rulemaking. The 1951 DurhamHumphrey Amendments provided that the agency may, by regulation,
change a drug to OTC status when the prescription status mandated by its
New Drug Application (NDA) approval is no longer “necessary for the
protection of the public health.” 200 In 1954, FDA established a procedure
for issuing so-called “switch regulations,” 201 and between 1955 and 1971,
the agency transferred approximately thirty drugs to OTC status under this
procedure. 202 Probably the most prominent of the medications switched in
this manner was acetaminophen (Tylenol®). 203
United States and Canada, 1 OPEN MED. e37–e45 (2007).
200. FD&C Act § 503(b)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (2012).
201. Exemption of Drugs from Prescription Requirements, 19 Fed. Reg. 7347 (Nov. 13,
1954), codified at 21 C.F.R. § 310.200 (2012) (previously §§ 130.101-102) (originally 21
C.F.R. § 1.108(c) (1954)).
202. 21 C.F.R. § 310.201 (2012) (previously 21 C.F.R. § 130.102). The first switches by
this mechanism occurred at 20 Fed. Reg. 3499, 3500 (May 19, 1955) (N-acetyl-paminophenol and sodium gentisate). The final one happened at 35 Fed. Reg. 16,638 (Oct.
27, 1970) (Tolnaftate). The provisions switching a number of these drugs have been
removed over the years as they have been superseded by monographs issued pursuant to the
OTC Drug Review, discussed below.
203. Exemption from Prescription Requirements, 20 Fed. Reg. 3499 (May 19, 1955),
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1.108(f)(1), now codified at 21 C.F.R. § 310.201(a)(1) (2012). In
1958, FDA revised this regulation to add the generic name “acetaminophen” to the
previously used N-acetyl-p-aminophenol. N-acetyl-p-aminophenol Preparations, 23 Fed.
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A second surge of switches commenced in the early 1970s, in connection
with a program called the OTC Drug Review (Review). Although the
Review was intended primarily to determine the effectiveness of drug
ingredients that were already sold over-the-counter prior to passage of the
1962 Drug Amendments, the resulting monographs listing legal OTC
ingredients also embraced some previously Rx-only products. Between the
1970s and the early 1990s, FDA switched approximately thirty-two drugs
through this mechanism, including, for example, hydrocortisone and
various cough and cold products. 204
The third switch era began in the mid-1980s, when FDA began
converting drugs from prescription to OTC by approving supplemental
NDAs (sNDAs) submitted by their manufacturers. 205 The 1984 switch of
ibuprofen (Advil®) from prescription to OTC status by this method was
followed by numerous additional important switches that fundamentally
changed the way in which Americans acquired treatment for common
health problems. Significant switched drugs include, for example:
loperamide (Imodium®) for diarrhea (1988); clotrimazole (Lotrimin®) for
athlete’s foot and jock itch (1989); permethrin (Nix®) for head lice (1990);
clotrimazole (Gyne-Lotrimin® and Mycelex®) for vaginal yeast infections
(1990); 206 famotidine (Pepcid AC®) for acid indigestion (1995); 207 nicotine
polacrilex (Nicorette®) for smoking cessation (1996); 208 and loratadine
(Claritin®) for seasonal allergies (2002). 209 These sNDA switches have
occurred quite regularly over the past twenty years. 210
Reg. 8285 (Oct. 28, 1958).
204. See Richard F. Kingham, Forcing Drugs to “OTC” Status Treads on Law and Patient
Safety, 16 WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 2 (2001); 21 C.F.R. pt. 348
(2012) (codifying final monograph for external analgesic products); 21 C.F.R. pt. 341 (2012)
(codifying final monograph for cold, cough, allergy, bronchodilator, and antiasthmatic drug
products).
205. Kingham, supra note 204, at 2.
206. Followed by miconazole nitrate (Monistat 7®) in 1991, butoconazole nitrate
(Femstat 3) in 1995, and tioconazole (Vagistat-1®) in 1997. See Ingredients and Dosages
Transferred from Rx-to-OTC Switch by the FDA Since 1975, CONSUMER HEALTHCARE PRODS.
ASS’N, http://www.chpa.org/switchlist.aspx (last visited May 13, 2014).
207. Followed by cimetidine (Tagamet HB®) in 1995, ranitidine (Zantac 75®) in 1995,
nizatidine (AXID AR®) in 1996, omeprazole magnesium (Prilosec OTC®) in 2003, and
lansoprazole (Prevacid 24) in 2009. Id.
208. Followed by nicotine transdermal system (Nicotrol®) in 1996. Id.
209. Followed by cetirizine HCI (Zyrtec®) in 2007 and fexofenadine hydrochloride
(Allegra) in 2011. Id.
210. According to the Consumer Healthcare Products Association (CHPA) website, 106
ingredients, indications, or dosage strengths have made the switch from prescription to
nonprescription status or have been newly approved since 1976, comprising more than 700
OTC products on the market today. FAQs About Rx-to-OTC Switch, CONSUMER
HEALTHCARE PRODS. ASS’N, http://www.chpa.org/SwitchFAQs.aspx (last visited May 13,
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Most of these Rx-OTC switches have occurred as part of the
economically motivated life-cycle management of the drugs by their
manufacturers; they were not provoked by popular movements for more
direct access. Nonetheless, scholars have posited that FDA’s approval of
such switches responds to a “growing desire of consumers to have greater
control over their health care” and to the “self-care movement.” 211
Moreover, the recent controversy over the OTC switch application and
petition for the “Plan B” emergency contraceptive 212 demonstrates the
potential for such switches to stir popular passions in at least some
instances. Due largely to the unique characteristics of that product, the
Plan B dispute represented perhaps the first instance in which OTC switch
advocates have contended that consumers have a right to access a drug
without a prescription. 213
In any event, the switch phenomenon of the past few decades reflects
FDA’s embrace of a modern vision of consumers as autonomous, capable
guardians of their own health. 214 Furthermore, the growing availability of
fundamental therapies on an OTC basis has undoubtedly reinforced this
view among consumers themselves.

2014).
211. Martin S. Lipsky & Theresa Waters, The “Prescription-to-OTC Switch” Movement: Its
Effects on Antifungal Vaginitis Preparations, 8 ARCHIVES OF FAMILY MED. 297, 300 (1999); see also
Randy P. Juhl, Prescription to Over-the-Counter Switch: A Regulatory Perspective, 20 CLINICAL
THERAPEUTICS C111, C111 (1998); Mariea Grubbs Hoy, Switch Drugs Vis-à-Vis Rx and OTC:
Policy, Marketing, and Research Considerations, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 85, 86, 89 (1994).
212. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 164, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(reviewing the entire dispute and ordering FDA to make the drug available OTC for women
of all ages).
213. For example, when the U.S. District Court ordered FDA to make Plan B One-Step
available over-the-counter for women ages fifteen and up, but maintained its prescription
status for younger women, the president and CEO of the Center for Reproductive Rights
declared in a press release: “[W]e will continue our battle in court to remove these arbitrary
restrictions on emergency contraception for all women.” Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod.
Rights, Despite Court Order to Make EC Available for Women of All Ages, FDA Approves
Plan B One-Step Only for Women 15 Years Old and Older (Apr. 30, 2013),
http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/despite-court-order-to-make-ec-available-forwomen-of-all-ages-fda-approves-plan-b-one-st. As discussed earlier, consumers in the 1970s
used rights rhetoric when they vociferously protested FDA’s attempt to “reverse switch” high
potency vitamin A and vitamin D products from OTC to prescription status. See supra notes
99-104 and accompanying text.
214. This trend has been supplemented by the proliferation of OTC diagnostic devices,
with home tests now available for blood pressure, cholesterol, blood glucose levels, and even
HIV.
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D. Social Movements
Finally, during the past few decades, the lay population has assumed a
greater role in pressuring FDA to make drugs more quickly and more
broadly accessible to the seriously ill. Ordinary citizens had little
involvement in FDA product approval decisions before the 1970s. These
processes were the exclusive domain of experts from inside and outside the
government, economically interested companies, and, sometimes,
sophisticated consumer organizations. But, as discussed above, the 1970s
saw the rise of citizen movements for vitamin and saccharin access. Shortly
after the successful culmination of these campaigns, masses of regular
people organized to resist FDA’s ban on another product—an alternative
cancer treatment derived from apricot pits called Laetrile (amygdalin). 215
FDA had been scuffling with purveyors of Laetrile since the early
1960s. 216 Nonetheless, for more than a decade, vocal support for the
Laetrile trade was confined largely to conspiracy theorists and right wing
extremists. 217 This began to change in 1972, with the arrest in California of
Dr. John A. Richardson, a Laetrile prescriber and member of the
reactionary John Birch Society. According to one scholar, this event
“launched a significant SM [social movement] that drew on spillover
support from the Birchers. However, the Bircher spur was soon subsumed
by increasing movement diversification, as people from across the political
spectrum united under the libertarian banner of medical freedom.”218 The
1976 federal indictment of nineteen people accused of smuggling Laetrile
into the United States from Mexico triggered a further surge in public
interest. 219
Meanwhile, a federal lawsuit filed by cancer patients seeking to enjoin
FDA from interfering with the interstate shipment and sale of Laetrile was
weaving its way through the federal judicial system. 220 In May 1977, FDA
held court-ordered public administrative hearings in Kansas City to resolve
some technical questions regarding Laetrile’s legal status. 221 These
215. For general discussions of the legal disputes regarding Laetrile, see JAMES HARVEY
YOUNG, AMERICAN HEALTH QUACKERY 205–55 (1992) and CARPENTER, supra note 26, at
410–28.
216. See YOUNG, supra note 215, at 211–17.
217. See id. at 215–18.
218. David J. Hess, Technology- and Product-Oriented Movements: Approximating Social Movement
Studies and Science and Technology Studies, 30 SCI., TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 515, 522 (2005).
219. See Heating Up: Latest Battle over a Cancer “Cure," U.S. NEWS &WORLD REPORT, June
21, 1976, at 46.
220. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 548 (1979). This litigation
ultimately concluded with a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court opinion affirming FDA’s
power to prohibit the sale of Laetrile. Id.
221. Laetrile, 42 Fed. Reg. 10,066, 10,066 (Feb. 18, 1977).
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hearings, jammed with boisterous Laetrile supporters, took on an almost
riotous atmosphere. 222
In 1977, Representative Steven D. Symms, citing “grass roots support”
deriving from outrage over the Laetrile situation, introduced federal
legislation titled the “Medical Freedom of Choice Bill.” 223 This law would
have repealed the power FDA acquired in the 1962 Drug Amendments to
review the efficacy as well as the safety of new drugs prior to marketing. 224
“Freedom is the issue,” Symms explained. “The American people should
be allowed to make their own decisions.”225 The Symms bill and parallel
measures ultimately gained 106 co-sponsors in the House of
Representatives. 226
In May 1977, the Washington Post opined that the Laetrile matter was
“already out of [the] control” of the “professionals,” and “bureaucrats.”
The newspaper’s editors observed: “The cancer dread, anti-establishment
sentiment and perhaps the ‘forbidden fruit’ aura have kindled a popular
fire.” 227 That same month, F. J. Ingelfinger, the editor of the New England
Journal of Medicine, suggested that FDA legalize Laetrile to calm the
“Laetrilomania.” 228 In June, the cover of Newsweek asked, “Laetrile and
Cancer: Should The Drug Be Banned?”229
In July 1977, a poll showed that 58% of Americans believed Laetrile
should be sold legally, versus only 28% who opined that it should remain
illegal. 230 Responding to this sentiment, a growing list of state legislatures
enacted Laetrile legalization laws. By the early 1980s, half of the states had
passed such statutes. 231 The passage of these laws followed a predictable
pattern. The introduction of a bill in the legislature would be followed by
222. See YOUNG, supra note 215, at 224; Laetrile Foes, Backers Clash at FDA Hearing, BALT.
SUN, May 3, 1977, at A3.
223. H.R. 54, 95th Cong. (1977); Legalize Laetrile as a Cancer Drug? Interview with
Representative Steven D. Symms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 13, 1977, at 51.
224. Legalize Laetrile as a Cancer Drug?, supra note 223, at 51; see Drug Amendments of
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780, 781–82 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p), 355(e)).
225. Legalize Laetrile as a Cancer Drug?, supra note 224, at 51.
226. H.R. 54 had nineteen co-sponsors but other versions of the bill garnered support as
well. See H.R. 4051, 95th Cong. (1977) (seven co-sponsors); H.R. 4648, 95th Cong. (1977)
(twenty-four co-sponsors); H.R. 6611, 95th Cong. (1977) (twenty-three co-sponsors); H.R.
8544, 95th Cong. (1977) (nine co-sponsors); H.R. 10397, 95th Cong. (1977) (one cosponsor); and H.R. 11261, 95th Cong. (1978) (one co-sponsor).
227. Editorial, Why Not a Laetrile Bill, WASH. POST, May 22, 1977, at F6.
228. F. J. Ingelfinger, Laetrilomania, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1167, 1167 (1977)
229. NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1977 (cover story).
230. THE ROPER ORG., ROPER REPS POLL: CONSUMERISM/GOVERNMENT/
RETIREMENT 5, 17 (1977). A contemporaneous Harris Poll showed that American opposed
the ban on Laetrile by more than two to one. Editorial, Saints, Laetrile, and the FDA, CHI.
TRIB., July 8, 1977, at B2.
231. YOUNG, supra note 215, at 221.
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dramatic and rowdy hearings packed with intense Laetrile supporters.
During these hearings, the testimony of scientific witnesses questioning
Laetrile’s efficacy would be countered by that of cancer survivors and
Laetrile movement leaders, pleading for freedom of choice. Finally, a flood
of mail to state lawmakers would culminate in enactment of a legalization
statute. 232
The public’s interest in Laetrile faded after the turn of the decade. The
1980 death from cancer of movie star Steve McQueen, the world’s most
prominent Laetrile user, apparently diminished their enthusiasm. 233
Passions waned further with the 1981 announcement that National Cancer
Institute trials had failed to demonstrate Laetrile’s effectiveness and had
also produced evidence of potential cyanide toxicity. 234 Even the Laetrile
supporters themselves began to moderate their claims for the drug. 235
Congressional bills to eliminate FDA’s power to review drug efficacy
stalled, and state Laetrile legalization statutes—which were preempted by
federal law and thus not enforceable in any event—stopped appearing.
Nevertheless, the Laetrile forces demonstrated how popular movements
for freedom of choice could shake FDA to its foundations. And if the
Laetrile advocates ultimately had no concrete effect on food and drug
regulation, the same cannot be said of their successors, the AIDS activists.
With the terrifying spread of the scourge of AIDS in the 1980s, groups
such as ACT UP, Project Inform, and the Gay Men’s Health Crisis
commenced an epic struggle to shape FDA’s decisions regarding drugs
intended to treat the disease. 236 As was the case with the vitamin,
saccharin, and Laetrile wars, the fight over the regulation of AIDS drugs
defied easy political categorization.

232. See id. at 221–22.
233. See McQueen Death Renews Cancer Treatment Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1980, at 21;
YOUNG, supra note 215, at 232–33.
234. See YOUNG, supra note 215, at 232–33.
235. See id. at 233–34.
236. See generally PETER S. ARNO & KARYN L. FEIDEN, AGAINST THE ODDS: THE STORY
OF AIDS DRUG DEVELOPMENT, POLITICS AND PROFITS 33 (1992); STEVEN EPSTEIN,
IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE 223 (1996); HILTS,
supra note 111, at 236–54; CARPENTER, supra note 26, at 428–57.
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Many of the arguments advanced by patient advocates—that government
officials should act faster, . . . be less concerned about drug side effects, and
allow consumers and their physicians to decide what risks they want to
take—paralleled those of ideological opponents to the whole drug regulatory
process, the conservatives . . . who believed that the government should not
poke its nose into the lives of citizens at all. 237

In 1986, under pressure from AIDS groups, FDA made the unapproved
investigational drug AZT available to patients outside of formal clinical
trials on a “compassionate-use basis.” 238 The next year, FDA approved the
NDA for AZT even though the drug had not undergone the large Phase 3
controlled clinical investigations ordinarily required for approval, and even
though experts expressed serious doubts about the product’s safety and
effectiveness. 239 Less than two years passed between the submission of the
Investigational New Drug (IND) application for AZT and FDA’s final
approval of the NDA—an astonishingly brief period compared to most
drugs. Another sign that the FDA was responding to the activists’ demands
occurred the very same day in 1987 as the AZT approval. The agency
proposed a “Treatment IND” rule that formalized the agency’s
longstanding ad hoc practice of allowing compassionate use of unapproved
drugs. 240 The rule, finalized two months later, permitted seriously ill people
with no satisfactory alternatives to gain access to investigational drugs that
“may be effective,” although this access was subject to strict limitations
designed to ensure that the drug would also be tested in controlled clinical
studies. 241
Despite these successes, subsequent events showed AIDS interest groups
that their victory was far from complete. Later in 1987, an FDA advisory
committee recommended against approving the NDA for ganciclovir, a
promising treatment for a blindness-inducing viral infection acquired by

237. ARNO & FEIDEN, supra note 236, at 33; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 236, at 223
(discussing AIDS groups’ cooperation with conservative policy groups). But see JIM EIGO ET
(Sept. 12, 1988), available at
AL., FDA ACTION HANDBOOK, ACTUP.ORG
http://www.actupny.org/documents/FDAhandbook4.html (warning participants in a
demonstration to “be careful to keep their agenda . . . from becoming confused with the
Bush Deregulation/Wall St. Journal/Heritage Foundation agenda of sweeping drug
industry deregulation.”).
238. ARNO & FEIDEN, supra note 236, at 43. This was a longstanding informal practice
at FDA. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 769 n.4.
239. ARNO & FEIDEN, supra note 236, at 45–46.
240. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations;
Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. 8850 (Mar. 19, 1987).
241. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations;
Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466 (May 22, 1987) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 312.7–.42).
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many AIDS victims. 242 The AIDS organizations were outraged by the
committee’s recommendation and threatened action. ACT UP warned
that it would “agitate until it becomes impossible for advisory
committees . . . to consign such drugs as ganciclovir to regulatory limbo.” 243
The AIDS groups then discovered that the new Treatment IND procedure
was more useful in theory than in fact. FDA interpreted the rule narrowly
when it imposed extremely strict access restrictions on the Treatment IND
for an AIDS drug called trimetrexate. 244
Following stormy congressional hearings, FDA surrendered and
broadened the terms of the trimetrexate IND, 245 but AIDS activists
nevertheless feared that the agency would remain an obstinate barrier to
early drug access. In September 1988, ACT UP conducted a highly
publicized symbolic takeover of FDA headquarters in suburban Maryland,
protesting the agency’s approach to ganciclovir, trimetrexate, and other
AIDS treatments. 246 The handbook for the action declared: “The FDA
says it exists to protect consumers. Well, people with HIV are consumers
too, and they need to be protected from a deadly disease.” 247
After this demonstration, FDA seemed more responsive to the concerns
of AIDS victims and their supporters. Just eight days after the takeover, the
agency promulgated an interim regulation, known as “Subpart E,” which
facilitated the quicker development and approval of drugs for lifethreatening and severely debilitating diseases. Subpart E did so by
guaranteeing drug companies early consultation with FDA on study design,
authorizing NDA approvals based solely on Phase 2 trial results, and
implementing a more flexible risk-benefit analysis that took into
consideration “the severity of the disease and the absence of satisfactory
alternative therapy.” 248
The activists’ success in influencing FDA policy became further apparent
in connection with ddI, a drug closely related to AZT. In response to
242. ARNO & FEIDEN, supra note 236, at 158–61. FDA had cleared the compassionate
use of this drug while it was under investigation, and the primary problem with the
manufacturers’ application, in the eyes of the committee, was the scientific invalidity of the
data collected from this widespread, non-controlled compassionate use. Id. at 159–60.
243. ARNO & FEIDEN, supra note 236, at 161.
244. See id. at 101–07.
245. Philip M. Boffey, Unproven AIDS Drug to Be Given Wider Use, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
1988, at B12.
246. EIGO ET AL., supra note 237; ARNO & FEIDEN, supra note 236, at 108; BRUCE
NUSSBAUM, GOOD INTENTIONS: HOW GOOD BUSINESS AND THE MEDICAL ESTABLISHMENT
ARE COMPETING THE FIGHT AGAINST AIDS 204–06 (1990).
247. EIGO ET AL., supra note 237.
248. 21 C.F.R. § 312.84(a) (2007). See generally Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat
Life-Threatening and Severely Debilitating Illnesses, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,516 (Oct. 21, 1988)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).
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continuing pressure from the AIDS community, FDA embraced a “parallel
track” approach to ddI, allowing patients who did not qualify for the
ongoing Phase 2 trials to take ddI for treatment purposes if they were not
helped by AZT. 249 In 1989, the AIDS activists, with the assistance of FDA
and National Institute of Health officials, persuaded ddI’s manufacturer to
make the drug available at no cost to such patients. 250 Afterward, FDA
officially embraced this “parallel track” mechanism. 251 In 1991, the agency
approved the NDA for ddI before the completion of the Phase 2 trials,
based on data showing efficacy in achieving surrogate endpoints (rather
than longer survival). 252 FDA formalized this procedure, as well, when it
promulgated its Accelerated Approval (“Subpart H”) regulations in 1992. 253
Eventually, the influence of the AIDS activists became visible in the
FD&C Act itself. The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
of 1997 (FDAMA) added FD&C Act § 506, which expedites the approval of
drugs for serious and life-threatening conditions. 254 This section codifies
FDA’s Subpart E regulations, under the rubric “Fast Track,” 255 and it also
codifies an expanded version of the agency’s 1992 Accelerated Approval
regulations. 256 FDAMA also added FD&C Act § 561, which codifies FDA’s
1987 treatment IND rule, as well as other early access mechanisms. 257 The
trend toward speedier patient access to important drugs continues today.
In the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012
(FDASIA), Congress revised FD&C Act § 506 to expand the designation
and advantages of Fast Track drugs, to create a new expedited approval
mechanism called “Breakthrough Therapy,” and to grant FDA greater
flexibility and discretion to use accelerated approval for drugs intended to
treat serious conditions. 258
249. ARNO & FEIDEN, supra note 236, at 177–85.
250. Id. at 179.
251. Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track
Mechanism for People with AIDS and HIV-Related Disease, 55 Fed. Reg. 20,856 (May 21,
1990); 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250 (Apr. 15, 1992). Interestingly, the policy was never codified in
the Code of Federal Regulations. See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 768
n.1.
252. ARNO & FEIDEN, supra note 236, at 223; EPSTEIN, supra note 236, at 275–76.
253. 57 Fed. Reg. 13,235 (Apr. 15, 1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 58,958 (Dec. 11, 1992) (codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314 subpart H).
254. Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 112, 111 Stat. 2296, 2309–10 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 356).
255. FD&C Act § 506(a), (b), (d); 21 U.S.C. § 356(a), (b), (d) (2012).
256. FD&C Act § 506(c), 21 U.S.C. § 356(c) (2012). FDA has been criticized for not
following Congress’s directive in § 506 to apply accelerated approval more expansively than
provided by the 1992 Subpart H regulations. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 3,
at 756.
257. FD&C Act § 561(c), 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (2012).
258. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), Pub. L. No.
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The AIDS groups’ impact should not be overstated; treatment INDs
remain rare, although not primarily because of agency reluctance to grant
them. 259 The activists’ influence should not be understated either, however.
The Fast Track procedure has been quite successful, and six Breakthrough
Therapy products have already been approved during that program’s short
life. 260 More broadly, due largely to the AIDS movement’s efforts, FDA’s
view of its own mission has evolved, and it now embraces the task not only
of protecting the public health by preventing the sale of dangerous products,
but also of enhancing the public health by ensuring access to useful
remedies. 261
Furthermore, the AIDS community forged a widely used model for
direct involvement in FDA decisionmaking. Ever since the early 1990s,
disease groups composed of ordinary citizens have regularly sought to sway
FDA decisions regarding drug approvals. FDA advisory committee
meetings, once technical affairs attended solely by scientists, bureaucrats,
lawyers, and corporate officials, are now occasionally crowded with
representatives of disease groups, some of whom offer impassioned
testimony. 262 Moreover, in response to demands of AIDS advocates, the
112-144, §§ 901–902, 126 Stat. 993, 1082–88 (2012), codified at FD&C Act § 506, 21
U.S.C. § 356.
259. The scarcity of Treatment INDs results largely from manufacturers’ reluctance to
expose themselves to potential tort liability and to risk interfering with their ongoing clinical
trials when they have no opportunity to make a profit. FDA rules regarding when
manufacturers may charge for investigational drugs have always been extremely restrictive.
See 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466 (May 22, 1987), codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d). Recent
amendments to this rule clarify, and perhaps liberalize, these charging rules. 74 Fed. Reg.
40,872 (Aug. 13, 2009), codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312.8. The rule permits a manufacturer,
with FDA permission, to charge for unapproved drugs used in a treatment protocol, but
only enough to recover its costs. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.8(d). For an analysis of reasons for
limited use of treatment INDs, see also Jerome Groopman, The Right to a Trial: Should Dying
Patients Have Access to Experimental Drugs?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 2006,
www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/06218_fa_fact.
260. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BREAKTHROUGH THERAPY APPROVALS, FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandappro
ved/drugandbiologicapprovalreports/ndaandblaapprovalreports/ucm373418.htm (updated
Mar. 10, 2014).
261. ARNO & FEIDEN, supra note 236, at 109. This shift of philosophy was codified by
Congress in 1997, which added § 903(b) (now § 1003(b)) to the FD&C Act, stating that
FDA’s mission is, first, to “promote the public health by promptly and efficiently reviewing
clinical research and taking appropriate action on the marketing of regulated products in a
timely manner,” and, second, to “protect the public health by ensuring that” these products
are safe and effective. See FD&C Act § 1003(b), 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2006).
262. For example, at a recent meeting of the Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee, the
participants in the open public hearing session ran the gambit from survivors with no ties to
the industry or technical background (“I’m married, 32-year-old mother with two young
children. . . . I’m here today to urge you to support making Perjeta available to . . . early
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agency in 1991 created a position for a Patient Representative on the
Antiviral Drugs Advisory Committee for HIV. 263 Inspired by this
development, cancer patient advocates requested similar representation. In
1996, the Clinton Administration provided that each FDA advisory
committee reviewing a cancer-related therapy should include a patient
representative “with experience in the specific malignancy” at issue. 264
Shortly afterward, FDA announced that these representatives would have
full voting privileges. 265
The AIDS activists also helped introduce into the mainstream the
argument, now often deployed, that patients, in consultation with their
doctors, should be able to perform their own risk-benefit balancing,
particularly when fatal and disabling diseases are at issue. Although drug
approval has not become measurably easier to achieve in the past quartercentury, FDA now must deal with this “freedom of choice” rhetoric
whenever it is reviewing the NDA for a drug intended to treat an otherwise
incurable condition. And in a few prominent instances, the consumer
choice argument has prevailed. For example, in response to protests by
sufferers of irritable bowel syndrome, the FDA in 2002 permitted the return
to the market of Lotronex®, a drug earlier withdrawn because of occasional
severe side effects. 266
The 2012 amendments to the FD&C Act demonstrate how the patientcentered ethos of the AIDS movement continues to shape federal drug
regulation today. In addition to making the changes discussed above, 267
FDASIA adds a new § 569C to the FD&C Act, titled “Patient Participation
in Medical Product Discussion.” 268 This provision obligates FDA to
breast cancer patients”) to patient advocacy groups (representatives from Facing Our Risk of
Cancer Empowered (FORCE) and BreastCancer.org, among others). U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, ONCOLOGIC DRUGS ADVISORY
COMM. MEETING TRANSCRIPT 175, 190, 193 (Sept. 12, 2013), FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drug
s/OncologicDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM377714.pdf.
263. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PATIENT NETWORK, FDA.GOV, http://www.patient
network.fda.gov/about-us/what-we-do (last visited July 7, 2014).
264. BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, REINVENTING THE REGULATION OF CANCER DRUGS:
ACCELERATING APPROVAL AND EXPANDING ACCESS 9 (1996), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4191B1_01_03-Reinvent-Cancer-Drugs.pdf.
265. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HISTORICAL OVERVIEW INFORMATION—CANCER
PATIENT REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/by
audience/forpatientadvocates/cancerliaisonprogram/ucm147019.htm (last visited July 24,
2014).
266. See Denise Grady, U.S. Lets Drug Tied to Deaths Back on Market, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/08/us/us-lets-drug-tied-to-deaths-back-on-mar
ket.html.
267. Supra text accompanying note 248.
268. FDASIA § 1137, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c (2012).
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“develop and implement strategies to solicit the views of patients during the
medical product development process and consider the perspectives of
patients during regulatory discussions.” 269 To this end, § 569C specifically
instructs FDA to encourage the participation of patient representatives, as
“special government employee[s],” in agency meetings with the sponsors of
drug, device, and biologic applications. 270
FDASIA has prompted FDA to embrace a broad initiative titled
“Patient-Focused Drug Development.” 271 The Prescription Drug User Fee
Act (PDUFA V), contained within FDASIA, binds FDA to detailed
performance goals for 2013 through 2017 set forth by the agency in a
separate document. 272 These goals promise to move patients ever closer to
the center of federal drug regulation. 273 Under the heading of “Enhancing
Benefit-Risk Assessment in Regulatory Decision-Making,” FDA commits
not only to increasing its use of patient representatives in regulatory
discussions about specific products, but also to holding four meetings per
year with patient advocates regarding various disease areas. In its notice of
this series of meetings, FDA explained:
A key part of regulatory decisionmaking is establishing the context in which
the particular decision is made. In drug regulation, this context includes a
thorough understanding of the severity of the treated condition and the
adequacy of the existing treatment options. Patients who live with a disease
have a direct stake in the outcome of the review process and are in a unique
position to contribute to weighing benefit-risk considerations that can occur
throughout the medical product development process. 274

In 1966, patients did not even get a place at FDA’s table. Now, they fill
banquet halls. 275
269. FD&C Act § 569C(a), 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8(c) (2012).
270. Id. at § 569C(a)(1).
271. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WEBINAR: BACKGROUND ON FDA AND PATIENTFOCUSED DRUG DEVELOPMENT, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/
PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm349133.htm (last visited May 13, 2014).
272. FDASIA § 101(b) (2012) (referring to goals identified in letters from the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to the Chairmen of the relevant House and Senate
Committees).
273. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PDUFA REAUTHORIZATION PERFORMANCE GOALS
AND PROCEDURES FISCAL YEARS 2013 THROUGH 2017, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/UCM270412.pdf (last visited
May 14, 2014).
274. 77 Fed. Reg. 58,848, 58,849 (Sept. 24, 2012).
275. In April 2013, as part of its patient-centered initiative, FDA launched a website
called “FDA Patient Network.” Among other functions, this site educates consumers on the
development and approval of drugs and medical devices, announces advisory committee
meetings, provides information about clinical trials and early access programs, and recruits
volunteers to serve as patient representatives on advisory committees and within the product
review divisions. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. PATIENT NETWORK, FDA.GOV, http://www.
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CONCLUSION
In 1986, Robert J. Kroll and Ronald W. Stampfl wrote an article
suggesting that the traditional conceptual division between Naderite
“consumerism supporters,” on the one hand, and pro-business “consumer
nonsupporters,” on the other, is overly binary and tends to obfuscate our
understanding of the public’s views on consumer issues. The authors
proposed adding another dimension of orientations toward consumerism,
one based on attitudes toward the role of consumer choice.
The authors hypothesize that both supporter and nonsupporter groups can
be identified which also differ along a solution preference dimension. That is,
some prefer a solution to consumer public policy issues which optimizes
individual choice (e.g., warning labels on products posing a health risk).
Other individuals, however, may relatively prefer choice-limiting solutions
(e.g., preventing products which pose a health risk from being sold at all). 276

The surveys performed by Kroll and Stampfl persuaded them that
“choice-limiting” versus “choice-allowing” solution preference “may be an
important second dimension that should be considered” when analyzing
orientations toward consumerism.” 277 Moreover, the authors observed a
striking generational divide with regard to this additional metric. A choiceallowing preference was negatively correlated with age, the single most
important demographic determinant of this dimension. 278 In other words,
this mid-1980s study showed that younger people were more inclined to
support solutions to consumer public policy issues that maximized
consumer choice. Today, that same group of people, twenty-five years
older, dominates the policymaking apparatus of this country, and they have
apparently carried their youthful preference for choice maximization into
their current roles.
Will FDA have to continue to reckon with the empowered consumer as
the twenty-first century progresses? To the extent that the phenomenon is
a product of the cultural and societal trends discussed at the start of this
Essay, it seems that the empowered consumer is here to stay for the
foreseeable future. Harris’s “Confidence in Leadership Index” has
remained stubbornly low for the past decade, far beneath its 1966 level. 279
“Rights” rhetoric seems as robust as ever. Furthermore, consumers’ access
to health information continues to expand. Not only is the percentage of

patientnetwork.fda.gov/ (last visited July 24, 2014).
276. Robert J. Kroll & Ronald W. Stampfl, Orientations Toward Consumerism: A Test of a
Two-Dimensional Theory, 20 J. CONSUMER AFF. 214, 215 (1986).
277. Id. at 228.
278. Id. at 225–26.
279. See HARRIS, Current Confidence in Leaders of Institutions, supra note 28.
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Americans who use the Internet still climbing, 280 but more and more of this
Internet use occurs on mobile devices, 281 which allow consumers to carry a
universe of information with them into supermarkets, pharmacies, and
doctors’ offices.
If the empowered consumer is at all disempowered in the future,
technological change will be one likely cause. The rise of technologies such
as gene therapy and personalized medicine may return health care to a
level of both technical and intellectual sophistication that makes trained
experts more frequently indispensable. Even nutrition science may move in
this direction, with the potential rise of nutrigenomics, a field that studies
how an individual’s unique genetic makeup determines the appropriate
nutrients and food for that individual. 282
And then there is the issue of cost. Due to the aging of the population
and the expansion of insurance coverage, among other reasons, national
health care expenditures are expected to grow robustly during the next
decade. 283 This increasing burden may lead to ever more economicallymotivated limitations on patient choice. Even as the Affordable Health
Care Act (ACA) 284 improves overall access to health care by ensuring that
most Americans have insurance, the imperative of systemic cost control will
likely bring about insurance coverage limitations that will, as a practical
matter, restrict patients’ choice among treatments. For example, in early
2014, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) proposed,
pursuant to the ACA, to allow Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit
Program sponsors to limit their formularies within three classes of drugs for
which such limitations are currently prohibited. 285 CMS backed down in
the face of fierce protests from patient advocates and pharmaceutical
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companies. 286 This episode may foreshadow a time when consumers no
longer deem FDA to be the primary bureaucratic obstacle to freedom of
choice among medical products.
For the foreseeable future, however, FDA will maintain its role as the
chief governmental gatekeeper of food and drug products and information
about them. And as consumers continue to negotiate their relationship
with this powerful agency, it is unlikely that they will ever return to the
passive position that Jane occupied in 1966.
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